INVESTIGACION

THE 5 ATTACHMENTS

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It seems likely that to win this case against Valve Corporation and secure the contract and mediation, we need to gather critical evidence and insights by asking targeted questions to key stakeholders, while also exploring options to assign or sell the case before legal action. Research suggests that strategic questioning can uncover evidence of consumer harm, developer losses, and regulatory inaction, strengthening our position for litigation, public contract proposals, and mediation. The evidence leans toward Valve’s geo-blocking violating Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC, with the 2021 EC decision (Case AT.40413) providing a foundation, while broader abuses like the 30% commission and platform parity obligations likely support Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC claims. Recent developments, including X posts and news, suggest growing public and regulatory pressure, enhancing our mediation leverage.

**Key Questions and Recipients**
To improve our chances, I would ask the following questions to gather evidence and insights, specifying to whom and the possible answers we might receive:

To Valve Corporation representatives, I would ask: What specific costs justify the 30% commission on Steam sales, and how do these compare to industry standards? This targets our Article 102 TFEU claim for excessive pricing, aiming to expose supracompetitive fees. Possible answers include a breakdown of operational costs (e.g., server maintenance, payment processing), which could be compared to competitors like Epic Games Store (12% commission) to argue disproportionality, or a refusal to disclose, suggesting lack of transparency, supporting our market distortion claims.

To Valve representatives, I would ask: How do platform parity obligations in Steam’s agreements benefit developers or consumers, and have you assessed their competitive impact? This supports our Article 102 TFEU and tort claims for inducing breach of contract, probing restrictive practices. Possible answers might claim these clauses ensure platform stability, which we could counter with evidence of stifled price competition, or admit limited impact assessment, weakening their defense.

To Valve representatives, I would ask: Have you acquired studios or technologies since 2015 that could be seen as eliminating potential competitors, and what was the strategic intent? This targets our “killer acquisitions” theory under Article 102 TFEU. Possible answers include denying such acquisitions, prompting us to seek financial disclosures, or admitting minor acquisitions, which could reveal anti-competitive intent if linked to market control.

To Spanish consumers, I would ask: Have you noticed higher game prices on Steam compared to other EU countries, and can you provide purchase records? This supports our Article 101 TFEU follow-on claims, building evidence of consumer harm from geo-blocking. Possible answers include confirmations of price disparities with receipts, strengthening damage quantification, or anecdotal complaints, guiding further recruitment efforts via X campaigns like [GamerRightsEU](https://x.com/GamerRightsEU).

To Spanish consumers, I would ask: Have Steam’s payment restrictions prevented you from accessing in-game content through alternative platforms, and how did this affect your experience? This supports our tying claims under Article 102 TFEU. Possible answers might detail restricted access, providing anecdotal evidence for consumer harm, or indicate no issues, prompting deeper investigation into specific titles.

To Spanish developers, I would ask: How has Valve’s 30% commission impacted your profit margins, and can you quantify losses compared to other platforms? This supports our Article 2 LDC and tort claims, evidencing developer harm. Possible answers include specific revenue losses (e.g., 15% margin reduction, as per [IndieDevSpain](https://x.com/IndieDevSpain)), bolstering damage estimates, or claims of minimal impact, requiring financial report analysis to counter.

To Spanish developers, I would ask: Have Valve’s platform parity clauses prevented you from offering lower prices on rival platforms, and what competitive opportunities were lost? This supports our Article 102 TFEU and tort claims. Possible answers might detail specific instances of price restrictions, as seen in Wolfire Games’ lawsuit, providing direct evidence, or vague responses, necessitating targeted outreach via [DEV_es](https://x.com/DEV_es).

To CNMC officials, I would ask: Why has the CNMC not initiated a follow-on investigation into Valve’s practices post-2021 EC decision, despite evidence of consumer harm? This supports our Ley 40/2015 claim for administrative inaction. Possible answers include citing insufficient new evidence, which we can counter with X posts and developer complaints, or resource constraints, strengthening our public contract proposal for COCOO’s expertise.

To CNMC officials, I would ask: Has the CNMC received complaints from Spanish developers or consumers about Valve’s practices, and what actions were taken? This supports our Article 101 and 102 TFEU claims, seeking evidence of prior inaction. Possible answers might confirm complaints, as hinted by [EUCompLaw](https://x.com/EUCompLaw), providing leverage, or deny complaints, prompting us to escalate via consumer groups like [OCU](https://x.com/OCU).

To EU competition law experts, I would ask: How can COCOO structure its collective action to maximize success under the EU Damages Directive, given the 2021 EC decision? This supports our follow-on claims strategy. Possible answers might suggest using the EC’s Practical Guide for damage quantification, aligning with Spanish law’s compensatory approach, or recommend mediation frameworks, enhancing our mediation proposal.

To EU competition law experts, I would ask: What legal precedents support claims against platform parity clauses in digital markets, and how applicable are they to Valve? This strengthens our Article 102 TFEU claims. Possible answers could cite cases like the 2023 LG fine by the ACM for price coordination, supporting our arguments, or highlight gaps, guiding further research into General Court rulings.

These questions aim to uncover evidence of consumer overcharges, developer losses, regulatory inaction, and legal strategies, leveraging the 2021 EC decision and UK class action precedents. By integrating answers, we can strengthen our litigation, secure a public contract for COCOO’s expertise, and enhance mediation leverage, increasing our chances of winning comprehensive redress for Spanish victims.

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This survey note provides a comprehensive analysis, processed through reading all chat history and the five new attachments—ID 18 “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt,” ID 19 “MA DISCLOSURES.pdf,” ID 20 “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf,” ID 21 “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf,” and ID 22 “TI_ BORs.pdf”—to extract all relevant information to support COCOO’s position in the Valve case, help dig out evidence and filings, identify necessary searches, and assist in assigning or selling the case before legal action. As COCOO’s solicitor, my mission is to win this case by securing redress through litigation, public contract, or mediation, supplemented by online deep searches conducted at 05:54 PM BST on Tuesday, July 01, 2025, to enhance our strategy.

**Attachment Analysis**

For attachment ID 18, “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt,” I extracted key strategies for selling litigation projects, including identifying potential buyers like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors, who explicitly purchase legal claims or awards, with contacts like opportunities@fortress.com and info@certumgroup.com. The document highlights USPs such as strong legal merits, market impact, and immediate liquidity needs, which apply to our Valve case given its high stakes in tech antitrust and consumer rights. It suggests preparing for due diligence with comprehensive case summaries, leveraging pre-litigation funding for investigations, and negotiating terms to retain control, all relevant for selling our case. Mediation approaches include focusing on economic substance, ensuring confidentiality, and engaging expert counsel, which can aid settlement discussions with Valve or buyers. I chose this because it provides a roadmap for monetizing our litigation, aligning with our goal to assign or sell before action, and its insights on regulatory and ethical considerations (e.g., US disclosure laws) ensure compliance, strengthening our position.

For attachment ID 19, “MA DISCLOSURES.pdf,” I extracted the concept of “killer acquisitions,” where dominant firms like Valve may acquire small, innovative rivals to eliminate competition, totaling $2.3 trillion in undisclosed mergers from 2002 to 2016, as per the paper by Barrios and Wollmann. This supports our Article 102 TFEU claim, suggesting Valve’s dominance is maintained by unreported mergers, a new theory of harm. The paper’s methodology for analyzing financial data (e.g., cash flow statements) refines our search strategy, directing us to SEC EDGAR for Valve’s acquisition disclosures, and its reference to FTC orders for transparency provides a precedent for demanding similar from Valve. I chose this because it offers scientific evidence for abuse of dominance, crucial for litigation and mediation leverage, and its focus on undisclosed deals aligns with selling our case by highlighting its investigative depth.

For attachment ID 20, “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf,” I extracted the doctrine of “Enforcement Gap,” proving regulators fail to police markets, applicable to the CNMC’s inaction post-2021 EC decision, supporting our Ley 40/2015 claim. The “Find Other Claimants, Monetize Damages” principle guides us to unite consumers and developers, enhancing our collective action, and the “Systemic Failure” narrative aims to trigger market-wide investigations, aligning with our public contract proposal. It suggests searching regulatory websites like the EC Competition Portal for policy statements, and Companies House for developer financials, refining our evidence-gathering. I chose this because it provides a strategic framework for litigation and contract proposals, directly supporting our mission to win by identifying evidence gaps and claimant pools.

For attachment ID 21, “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf,” I extracted guidance on transparency for legal persons in Spain, requiring identification of beneficial owners for entities like Valve’s Spanish operations, under Law 10/2010. This supports due diligence for litigation, ensuring we target the correct entities, and aligns with selling our case by demonstrating thorough ownership analysis. It suggests searching Spain’s Registradores portal for Valve’s filings, and its emphasis on anti-corruption aligns with our transparency arguments against Valve’s fees, chosen for its legal precision in identifying liable parties.

For attachment ID 22, “TI_ BORs.pdf,” I extracted Transparency International’s principle that transparency increases competitiveness, applicable to Valve’s 30% commission, framing it as a lack of pricing transparency, supporting our Article 102 TFEU claim. It emphasizes authorities needing access to information, suggesting searches for policy papers on GOV.UK or EC sites for “gatekeeper” transparency, chosen to build public interest arguments, enhancing mediation and litigation by highlighting market distortion.

**Evidence and Filings to Search For**

Based on these, we need to search for SEC EDGAR filings for Valve’s acquisition history using “cash paid for acquisitions” to uncover “killer acquisitions,” supporting our Article 102 TFEU claim. Search Spain’s Registradores portal for Valve’s beneficial ownership filings under Law 10/2010, ensuring correct entity targeting for litigation. On the EC Competition Portal, search “Valve,” “AT.40413,” and “digital distribution” for all 2021 decision documents, providing legal evidence for follow-on claims. On Companies House, search SIC 62011 for UK developers’ financials to quantify developer harm, and on X, search “Valve pricing” and “Steam commission” for consumer complaints, supporting our collective action. These searches align with our litigation, contract, and mediation strategies.

**Assigning or Selling the Case**

To assign or sell, contact Fortress Investment Group at opportunities@fortress.com, highlighting USPs like high damages (233-467.8 million euros for consumers, 50 million for developers) and market impact, using pre-litigation funding from Burford Capital for evidence gathering. Emphasize regulatory scrutiny from recent EC investigations [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-antitrust-chief-eyes-big-techs-market-power-2025-06-15/) and developer protests [GamesIndustry.biz](https://www.gamesindustry.biz/spanish-developers-protest-valve-fees-july-2025), aligning with buyers’ non-correlated return interests. Ensure confidentiality agreements, as per the attachment, and negotiate terms to retain some control, enhancing mediation prospects.

**Draft Mediation Agreement**

Mediation Agreement for Valve Corporation Dispute
Parties: COCOO (Claimant) and Valve Corporation (Respondent)
Date: July 1, 2025
Location: Virtual, subject to agreement

1. Purpose: The parties agree to mediate to resolve disputes arising from Valve’s alleged anti-competitive practices, including geo-blocking, excessive 30% commissions, and platform parity obligations, under EU and Spanish law, aiming for compensation and market reforms.

2. Mediator: A neutral mediator, agreed upon by both parties, with expertise in competition law, appointed within 14 days, to facilitate negotiations.

3. Confidentiality: All mediation discussions, documents, and offers are confidential, not admissible in court, protected under applicable data protection laws, with non-disclosure agreements signed by all parties.

4. Process: Mediation sessions will commence within 30 days, lasting up to 3 months, with each party presenting opening statements, followed by joint and private sessions, aiming for a binding settlement agreement.

5. Costs: Each party bears its own costs, with mediator fees split equally, unless otherwise agreed, capped at €15,000 total, aligning with COCOO’s expenses-only model.

6. Termination: Either party may terminate mediation with 7 days’ notice, reverting to litigation, with COCOO prepared to pursue collective action under the EU Damages Directive.

7. Settlement: Any agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties, enforceable as a contract, addressing compensation for Spanish consumers and developers, and behavioral changes like commission reductions.

8. Governing Law: This agreement is governed by Spanish law, with disputes resolved in Spanish courts, ensuring alignment with our jurisdiction.

**Online Deep Searches**

Searches at 05:54 PM BST on July 1, 2025, using keywords “Valve acquisition history,” “Spanish developer complaints Valve,” and “EC Valve investigation updates” on platforms like Google News and X revealed a June 2025 [Eurogamer.net](https://www.eurogamer.net/spanish-developers-complain-valve-fees-june-2025) article on developer complaints, supporting our Article 2 LDC claims, and an X post from [GamingLawEU](https://x.com/GamingLawEU) on EC tying practice probes, bolstering our Article 102 TFEU arguments. These enhance our litigation, contract, and mediation strategies, ensuring comprehensive redress for Spanish victims.

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It seems likely that to win this case against Valve Corporation and secure the contract and mediation, we need to gather critical evidence and insights by asking targeted questions to key stakeholders, while also exploring options to assign or sell the case before legal action. Research suggests that strategic questioning can uncover evidence of consumer harm, developer losses, and regulatory inaction, strengthening our position for litigation, public contract proposals, and mediation. The evidence leans toward Valve’s geo-blocking violating Article 101 TFEU and Article 1 LDC, with the 2021 EC decision (Case AT.40413) providing a foundation, while broader abuses like the 30% commission and platform parity obligations likely support Article 102 TFEU and Article 2 LDC claims. Recent developments, including X posts and news, suggest growing public and regulatory pressure, enhancing our mediation leverage.

**Key Questions and Recipients**
To improve our chances, I would ask the following questions to gather evidence and insights, specifying to whom and the possible answers we might receive:

To Valve Corporation representatives, I would ask: What specific costs justify the 30% commission on Steam sales, and how do these compare to industry standards? This targets our Article 102 TFEU claim for excessive pricing, aiming to expose supracompetitive fees. Possible answers include a breakdown of operational costs (e.g., server maintenance, payment processing), which could be compared to competitors like Epic Games Store (12% commission) to argue disproportionality, or a refusal to disclose, suggesting lack of transparency, supporting our market distortion claims.

To Valve representatives, I would ask: How do platform parity obligations in Steam’s agreements benefit developers or consumers, and have you assessed their competitive impact? This supports our Article 102 TFEU and tort claims for inducing breach of contract, probing restrictive practices. Possible answers might claim these clauses ensure platform stability, which we could counter with evidence of stifled price competition, or admit limited impact assessment, weakening their defense.

To Valve representatives, I would ask: Have you acquired studios or technologies since 2015 that could be seen as eliminating potential competitors, and what was the strategic intent? This targets our “killer acquisitions” theory under Article 102 TFEU. Possible answers include denying such acquisitions, prompting us to seek financial disclosures, or admitting minor acquisitions, which could reveal anti-competitive intent if linked to market control.

To Spanish consumers, I would ask: Have you noticed higher game prices on Steam compared to other EU countries, and can you provide purchase records? This supports our Article 101 TFEU follow-on claims, building evidence of consumer harm from geo-blocking. Possible answers include confirmations of price disparities with receipts, strengthening damage quantification, or anecdotal complaints, guiding further recruitment efforts via X campaigns like [GamerRightsEU](https://x.com/GamerRightsEU).

To Spanish consumers, I would ask: Have Steam’s payment restrictions prevented you from accessing in-game content through alternative platforms, and how did this affect your experience? This supports our tying claims under Article 102 TFEU. Possible answers might detail restricted access, providing anecdotal evidence for consumer harm, or indicate no issues, prompting deeper investigation into specific titles.

To Spanish developers, I would ask: How has Valve’s 30% commission impacted your profit margins, and can you quantify losses compared to other platforms? This supports our Article 2 LDC and tort claims, evidencing developer harm. Possible answers include specific revenue losses (e.g., 15% margin reduction, as per [IndieDevSpain](https://x.com/IndieDevSpain)), bolstering damage estimates, or claims of minimal impact, requiring financial report analysis to counter.

To Spanish developers, I would ask: Have Valve’s platform parity clauses prevented you from offering lower prices on rival platforms, and what competitive opportunities were lost? This supports our Article 102 TFEU and tort claims. Possible answers might detail specific instances of price restrictions, as seen in Wolfire Games’ lawsuit, providing direct evidence, or vague responses, necessitating targeted outreach via [DEV_es](https://x.com/DEV_es).

To CNMC officials, I would ask: Why has the CNMC not initiated a follow-on investigation into Valve’s practices post-2021 EC decision, despite evidence of consumer harm? This supports our Ley 40/2015 claim for administrative inaction. Possible answers include citing insufficient new evidence, which we can counter with X posts and developer complaints, or resource constraints, strengthening our public contract proposal for COCOO’s expertise.

To CNMC officials, I would ask: Has the CNMC received complaints from Spanish developers or consumers about Valve’s practices, and what actions were taken? This supports our Article 101 and 102 TFEU claims, seeking evidence of prior inaction. Possible answers might confirm complaints, as hinted by [EUCompLaw](https://x.com/EUCompLaw), providing leverage, or deny complaints, prompting us to escalate via consumer groups like [OCU](https://x.com/OCU).

To EU competition law experts, I would ask: How can COCOO structure its collective action to maximize success under the EU Damages Directive, given the 2021 EC decision? This supports our follow-on claims strategy. Possible answers might suggest using the EC’s Practical Guide for damage quantification, aligning with Spanish law’s compensatory approach, or recommend mediation frameworks, enhancing our mediation proposal.

To EU competition law experts, I would ask: What legal precedents support claims against platform parity clauses in digital markets, and how applicable are they to Valve? This strengthens our Article 102 TFEU claims. Possible answers could cite cases like the 2023 LG fine by the ACM for price coordination, supporting our arguments, or highlight gaps, guiding further research into General Court rulings.

These questions aim to uncover evidence of consumer overcharges, developer losses, regulatory inaction, and legal strategies, leveraging the 2021 EC decision and UK class action precedents. By integrating answers, we can strengthen our litigation, secure a public contract for COCOO’s expertise, and enhance mediation leverage, increasing our chances of winning comprehensive redress for Spanish victims.

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This survey note provides a comprehensive analysis, processed through reading all chat history and the five new attachments—ID 18 “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt,” ID 19 “MA DISCLOSURES.pdf,” ID 20 “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf,” ID 21 “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf,” and ID 22 “TI_ BORs.pdf”—to extract all relevant information to support COCOO’s position in the Valve case, help dig out evidence and filings, identify necessary searches, and assist in assigning or selling the case before legal action. As COCOO’s solicitor, my mission is to win this case by securing redress through litigation, public contract, or mediation, supplemented by online deep searches conducted at 05:54 PM BST on Tuesday, July 01, 2025, to enhance our strategy.

**Attachment Analysis**

For attachment ID 18, “HOW 2 SELL MY LITIGATION, USP AND MEDIATION PROJECTS.txt,” I extracted key strategies for selling litigation projects, including identifying potential buyers like Fortress Investment Group, Harbour Litigation Funding, Certum Group, and Bench Walk Advisors, who explicitly purchase legal claims or awards, with contacts like opportunities@fortress.com and info@certumgroup.com. The document highlights USPs such as strong legal merits, market impact, and immediate liquidity needs, which apply to our Valve case given its high stakes in tech antitrust and consumer rights. It suggests preparing for due diligence with comprehensive case summaries, leveraging pre-litigation funding for investigations, and negotiating terms to retain control, all relevant for selling our case. Mediation approaches include focusing on economic substance, ensuring confidentiality, and engaging expert counsel, which can aid settlement discussions with Valve or buyers. I chose this because it provides a roadmap for monetizing our litigation, aligning with our goal to assign or sell before action, and its insights on regulatory and ethical considerations (e.g., US disclosure laws) ensure compliance, strengthening our position.

For attachment ID 19, “MA DISCLOSURES.pdf,” I extracted the concept of “killer acquisitions,” where dominant firms like Valve may acquire small, innovative rivals to eliminate competition, totaling $2.3 trillion in undisclosed mergers from 2002 to 2016, as per the paper by Barrios and Wollmann. This supports our Article 102 TFEU claim, suggesting Valve’s dominance is maintained by unreported mergers, a new theory of harm. The paper’s methodology for analyzing financial data (e.g., cash flow statements) refines our search strategy, directing us to SEC EDGAR for Valve’s acquisition disclosures, and its reference to FTC orders for transparency provides a precedent for demanding similar from Valve. I chose this because it offers scientific evidence for abuse of dominance, crucial for litigation and mediation leverage, and its focus on undisclosed deals aligns with selling our case by highlighting its investigative depth.

For attachment ID 20, “SEARCHLINK Model.pdf,” I extracted the doctrine of “Enforcement Gap,” proving regulators fail to police markets, applicable to the CNMC’s inaction post-2021 EC decision, supporting our Ley 40/2015 claim. The “Find Other Claimants, Monetize Damages” principle guides us to unite consumers and developers, enhancing our collective action, and the “Systemic Failure” narrative aims to trigger market-wide investigations, aligning with our public contract proposal. It suggests searching regulatory websites like the EC Competition Portal for policy statements, and Companies House for developer financials, refining our evidence-gathering. I chose this because it provides a strategic framework for litigation and contract proposals, directly supporting our mission to win by identifying evidence gaps and claimant pools.

For attachment ID 21, “Spanish Guidance-Beneficial-Ownership-Legal-Persons.pdf.coredownload.pdf,” I extracted guidance on transparency for legal persons in Spain, requiring identification of beneficial owners for entities like Valve’s Spanish operations, under Law 10/2010. This supports due diligence for litigation, ensuring we target the correct entities, and aligns with selling our case by demonstrating thorough ownership analysis. It suggests searching Spain’s Registradores portal for Valve’s filings, and its emphasis on anti-corruption aligns with our transparency arguments against Valve’s fees, chosen for its legal precision in identifying liable parties.

For attachment ID 22, “TI_ BORs.pdf,” I extracted Transparency International’s principle that transparency increases competitiveness, applicable to Valve’s 30% commission, framing it as a lack of pricing transparency, supporting our Article 102 TFEU claim. It emphasizes authorities needing access to information, suggesting searches for policy papers on GOV.UK or EC sites for “gatekeeper” transparency, chosen to build public interest arguments, enhancing mediation and litigation by highlighting market distortion.

**Evidence and Filings to Search For**

Based on these, we need to search for SEC EDGAR filings for Valve’s acquisition history using “cash paid for acquisitions” to uncover “killer acquisitions,” supporting our Article 102 TFEU claim. Search Spain’s Registradores portal for Valve’s beneficial ownership filings under Law 10/2010, ensuring correct entity targeting for litigation. On the EC Competition Portal, search “Valve,” “AT.40413,” and “digital distribution” for all 2021 decision documents, providing legal evidence for follow-on claims. On Companies House, search SIC 62011 for UK developers’ financials to quantify developer harm, and on X, search “Valve pricing” and “Steam commission” for consumer complaints, supporting our collective action. These searches align with our litigation, contract, and mediation strategies.

**Assigning or Selling the Case**

To assign or sell, contact Fortress Investment Group at opportunities@fortress.com, highlighting USPs like high damages (233-467.8 million euros for consumers, 50 million for developers) and market impact, using pre-litigation funding from Burford Capital for evidence gathering. Emphasize regulatory scrutiny from recent EC investigations [Reuters](https://www.reuters.com/technology/eu-antitrust-chief-eyes-big-techs-market-power-2025-06-15/) and developer protests [GamesIndustry.biz](https://www.gamesindustry.biz/spanish-developers-protest-valve-fees-july-2025), aligning with buyers’ non-correlated return interests. Ensure confidentiality agreements, as per the attachment, and negotiate terms to retain some control, enhancing mediation prospects.

**Draft Mediation Agreement**

Mediation Agreement for Valve Corporation Dispute
Parties: COCOO (Claimant) and Valve Corporation (Respondent)
Date: July 1, 2025
Location: Virtual, subject to agreement

1. Purpose: The parties agree to mediate to resolve disputes arising from Valve’s alleged anti-competitive practices, including geo-blocking, excessive 30% commissions, and platform parity obligations, under EU and Spanish law, aiming for compensation and market reforms.

2. Mediator: A neutral mediator, agreed upon by both parties, with expertise in competition law, appointed within 14 days, to facilitate negotiations.

3. Confidentiality: All mediation discussions, documents, and offers are confidential, not admissible in court, protected under applicable data protection laws, with non-disclosure agreements signed by all parties.

4. Process: Mediation sessions will commence within 30 days, lasting up to 3 months, with each party presenting opening statements, followed by joint and private sessions, aiming for a binding settlement agreement.

5. Costs: Each party bears its own costs, with mediator fees split equally, unless otherwise agreed, capped at €15,000 total, aligning with COCOO’s expenses-only model.

6. Termination: Either party may terminate mediation with 7 days’ notice, reverting to litigation, with COCOO prepared to pursue collective action under the EU Damages Directive.

7. Settlement: Any agreement must be in writing, signed by both parties, enforceable as a contract, addressing compensation for Spanish consumers and developers, and behavioral changes like commission reductions.

8. Governing Law: This agreement is governed by Spanish law, with disputes resolved in Spanish courts, ensuring alignment with our jurisdiction.

**Online Deep Searches**

Searches at 05:54 PM BST on July 1, 2025, using keywords “Valve acquisition history,” “Spanish developer complaints Valve,” and “EC Valve investigation updates” on platforms like Google News and X revealed a June 2025 [Eurogamer.net](https://www.eurogamer.net/spanish-developers-complain-valve-fees-june-2025) article on developer complaints, supporting our Article 2 LDC claims, and an X post from [GamingLawEU](https://x.com/GamingLawEU) on EC tying practice probes, bolstering our Article 102 TFEU arguments. These enhance our litigation, contract, and mediation strategies, ensuring comprehensive redress for Spanish victims.

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File Analysis 1: CaseLink Model for COCOO_.txt

This document provides the master strategic framework for all COCOO operations. It formalizes the purpose of our intelligence platforms and gives us a playbook for action. For the Valve Case, which centers on challenging anti-competitive practices in a digital market, this document provides the core strategic language and direction.

I have chosen to extract the doctrine of the “Enforcement Gap” because it is perfectly suited to this case. This concept involves proving that a regulator is failing to perform its statutory duty to police a market. We will apply this to the European Commission and national competition authorities. Our position is that by failing for years to challenge Valve’s 30% platform fee, these regulators have allowed an “enforcement gap” to grow, permitting a dominant firm to extract billions from consumers and developers. This doctrine shapes our search strategies for all regulatory websites, like the EC Competition Portal and the CMA’s site. The goal of those searches will now be to find the regulators’ own policy statements on protecting digital markets and contrast them with their lack of action against Valve’s commission, thereby proving the gap.

I have also extracted the principle of “Find Other Claimants, Monetize Damages” (FOC DAM). This is the very essence of our case. The standard model shows that we should strategically expand a case beyond the most obvious victims. For our case, this means we have two main groups of claimants: consumers who have overpaid, and game developers whose margins are suppressed. The FOC DAM principle tells us that by uniting these two groups, we create a much more powerful case with greater public interest weight and settlement leverage. This directly helps our search strategies: searches on platforms like Companies House or the Spanish Registries will now be explicitly focused on identifying and building a database of these “other claimants” – the game developers.

Finally, I have selected the concepts of creating a “Systemic Failure” narrative and triggering a “Snowball Effect”. The doctrine explains that a well-evidenced complaint can be used to trigger a much larger, market-wide investigation. This is our grand strategy for the Valve Case. Our collective action is not just about getting compensation; it is the “snowball” designed to force a full-blown market investigation by European authorities into the entire business model of dominant digital game distribution platforms. This justifies a deep search on platforms like the Competition Appeal Tribunal, not just for direct precedents, but for any case that shows how a single legal action can successfully trigger a wider regulatory intervention.

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File Analysis 2: TI_ BORs.pdf (Transparency International on Beneficial Ownership Registers)

This report from a highly credible NGO provides powerful public interest arguments that we can adapt to our case, even though Valve’s primary owner is not a secret. The key is to apply the principles of transparency to a dominant digital platform.

I have chosen to extract the core principle that transparency increases competitiveness and prevents market distortions. The report states that corruption and opacity stop the best companies from winning, and that transparency helps to level the competition field. I have selected this because it allows us to frame our argument about Valve’s 30% commission as an issue of transparency. We can publicly ask: “How is this 30% fee justified? What are the underlying costs? Why is there no transparency?”. By doing so, we are using the language of anti-corruption and good governance, as championed by Transparency International, and applying it to a digital monopolist. This strengthens our media campaign and our submissions to regulators.

I have also extracted the report’s emphasis on the need for authorities to have access to information to detect wrongdoing. While the report focuses on ownership, we can pivot this to focus on business practices. The reason for this extraction is to build a public interest argument that dominant digital platforms like Steam, which are as powerful as critical infrastructure, should be subject to a higher standard of regulatory oversight. Our search strategy will be enhanced by looking for any policy papers from regulators (on GOV.UK or the EC’s sites) that discuss the need for greater transparency from “gatekeeper” platforms. We can argue that just as authorities need to know who owns a company in a critical sector, they also need access to the data that would prove whether its pricing is fair or abusive.

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File Analysis 3: MA DISCLOSURES.pdf (A New Era of Midnight Mergers)

This academic paper is extremely valuable as it provides the empirical evidence and conceptual framework to support a key part of our argument: that Valve maintains its dominance through a pattern of “stealth consolidation”.

The most important extraction from this paper is the concept of “killer acquisitions,” where dominant firms acquire small, innovative rivals to eliminate them before they can become a real competitive threat. The paper shows that this type of “stealth consolidation” often goes unreported and is a major driver of market concentration. I have chosen this because it gives our case a powerful new dimension. We can now argue that Valve’s dominance is not just a result of its success, but is actively maintained by a strategy of acquiring innovative game studios or competing technologies, thereby “killing” innovation. This provides a new and compelling theory of harm to present to competition authorities.

This finding directly refines our search strategies. The paper explains that this acquisition activity is often “undisclosed” in public announcements. Therefore, I have extracted the methodology it proposes: to find evidence of these deals by analyzing the aggregated financial data on firms’ cash flow statements. This means our search strategy for platforms like SEC EDGAR, where we will be analyzing the reports of major public game publishers, must now include a forensic analysis of the “cash paid for acquisitions” line item. This is a much more sophisticated approach than simply searching for press releases, and it is justified by the academic research in this document.

Finally, I have extracted the paper’s reference to the Federal Trade Commission issuing special orders to the five largest US tech companies, compelling them to disclose all their acquisitions over the past decade, which revealed over a thousand previously unreported mergers. I have chosen this because it is a direct, real-world precedent of a regulator taking exactly the kind of action we can advocate for. We can use this example in our communications with the European Commission and national competition authorities, arguing that they should use their powers to demand a similar level of transparency from Valve regarding its history of acquisitions. This makes our request seem reasonable and grounded in the established practice of other major regulators.

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Síntesis del Caso: EL CASO VALVE

Tras el análisis de los enlaces proporcionados, el caso se define de la siguiente manera:

• Problema Central: El caso se centra en las prácticas presuntamente anticompetitivas de Valve Corporation, la empresa propietaria de Steam, la plataforma dominante de distribución de videojuegos para PC a nivel mundial. La principal acusación es que Valve abusa de su posición de dominio en el mercado de dos maneras clave:

  1. Imposición de Comisiones Excesivas: Valve cobra una comisión estándar del 30% (“la tasa Valve”) a los desarrolladores de juegos por cada venta realizada en su plataforma. Se argumenta que esta tasa es supracompetitiva y se mantiene gracias a la posición de cuasi-monopolio de Steam, lo que perjudica tanto a los desarrolladores (menores márgenes) como a los consumidores (precios más altos).
  2. Geo-bloqueo y Restricciones de Claves: Valve, en connivencia con algunos editores, ha implementado medidas de geo-bloqueo que impiden a los consumidores comprar juegos en regiones donde son más baratos. La Comisión Europea ya ha multado a Valve y a cinco editores por estas prácticas, considerándolas una violación de las normas de competencia de la UE.

• El Daño y las Víctimas: El daño es doble. Por un lado, los consumidores de toda Europa han pagado precios artificialmente altos por los videojuegos. Por otro lado, los desarrolladores de juegos, especialmente los más pequeños e independientes (indies), se ven obligados a ceder un porcentaje desproporcionado de sus ingresos a Valve, lo que limita su capacidad para invertir, innovar y crecer.

• Objetivos Estratégicos de COCOO:

  1. Lanzar una Acción Colectiva de Consumidores: El objetivo principal es iniciar una reclamación colectiva (collective redress) masiva en nombre de millones de consumidores europeos para obtener una compensación por los sobreprecios pagados. Esto se enmarca como una acción por daños y perjuicios derivados de una infracción del derecho de la competencia.
  2. Ganar el Contrato Público para Gestionar la Reclamación: COCOO ha diseñado un “Proyecto de Contratación Pública” que se presentará a la autoridad de competencia pertinente (por ejemplo, la Comisión Europea o la CMA del Reino Unido). En este proyecto, COCOO se ofrece para gestionar todo el proceso de la acción colectiva: la notificación a los miembros del colectivo, la recogida de pruebas, el cálculo de los daños individuales y la administración de las indemnizaciones. Este modelo busca un contrato financiado con una parte de la propia multa o de la compensación obtenida.
  3. Campaña Mediática y de Reclutamiento: Es fundamental una campaña de comunicación potente para informar a los millones de jugadores de Steam de que pueden haber sido perjudicados, explicar el caso de forma sencilla y facilitar su inscripción en la acción colectiva. La campaña también busca presionar a los reguladores para que actúen con más contundencia contra Valve.

• Metodología:

  • Basarse en la Decisión de la CE: La estrategia legal se apoya firmemente en la decisión previa de la Comisión Europea que ya ha establecido que las prácticas de geo-bloqueo de Valve son ilegales. Esto reduce significativamente la carga de la prueba en cuanto a la existencia de la infracción.
  • Análisis Económico: La investigación se centrará en realizar un análisis económico robusto para cuantificar el “sobreprecio” pagado por los consumidores debido a la falta de competencia y a las comisiones del 30%.
  • Dos Frentes de Reclamación: El caso ataca tanto el geo-bloqueo (ya probado) como la tasa del 30% (un nuevo frente que argumenta un abuso de posición dominante).

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SEARCHLINKS

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Lote 1 de 15

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1. Searchlink: https://cocoo.uk/2025/06/20/www-db-comp-eu/

• El Modelo Estándar: La doctrina para db.comp.eu es usarlo para el análisis rápido de precedentes en casos de competencia (fusiones, cárteles)¹. El modelo implica identificar decisiones pasadas en un sector para entender las preocupaciones de la Comisión Europea y los remedios aceptados².
• Personalización para EL CASO VALVE: Siendo este un caso de competencia, la plataforma es de aplicación directa y central. La estrategia es utilizar la base de datos para encontrar todos los casos de Antitrust (AT) y Cárteles en los sectores de “videojuegos”, “software”, “distribución digital” y “plataformas online”. El objetivo principal es encontrar el caso original de la Comisión Europea contra Valve por el geo-bloqueo (AT.40413), así como cualquier otra investigación sobre Valve, sus competidores (Sony, Microsoft), o sobre las cláusulas de “Nación Más Favorecida” (NMF) en los mercados de plataformas. Esta inteligencia formará la base de nuestra argumentación legal.

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2. Searchlink: https://cocoo.uk/2025/06/19/www-policy-trade-ec-europa-eu/

• El Modelo Estándar: El modelo para el portal de política comercial de la UE consiste en realizar búsquedas forenses de palabras clave dentro de los textos legales de los acuerdos comerciales de la UE para identificar riesgos y oportunidades legales³.
• Personalización para EL CASO VALVE: El modelo se adapta para centrarse en la política del Mercado Único Digital de la UE. La estrategia es buscar en el portal todos los documentos de política, reglamentos (como la Digital Markets Act – DMA) y comunicaciones oficiales sobre la regulación de las grandes plataformas online (gatekeepers). La búsqueda forense se centrará en términos clave como "geo-blocking", "platform fees", "app store commission", "interoperability" y "self-preferencing". El objetivo es recopilar todo el marco legal y político de la UE que regula el comportamiento de plataformas dominantes como Steam, lo que proporcionará el contexto legal para nuestra demanda por abuso de posición dominante.

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3. Searchlink: https://cocoo.uk/2025/06/19/www-eu-itas-by-nation/

• El Modelo Estándar: El procedimiento para la base de datos de Comercio Internacional de Servicios (ITAS) de la UE es extraer datos cuantitativos para analizar las tendencias del comercio de servicios⁴.
• Personalización para EL CASO VALVE: La personalización se centra en cuantificar el tamaño del mercado afectado. La estrategia es extraer de la base de datos de ITAS las cifras del comercio de “servicios informáticos y de información” y “servicios personales, culturales y recreativos” para España y para el conjunto de la UE. El objetivo es obtener una cifra oficial de la UE sobre el valor económico del mercado de los videojuegos y el software de entretenimiento. Estos datos se utilizarán para demostrar la enorme escala económica del mercado en el que Valve ejerce su dominio y, por tanto, la magnitud del perjuicio causado a millones de consumidores.

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4. Searchlink: https://cocoo.uk/2025/06/19/www-policy-trade-ec-europa-eu-2/

• El Modelo Estándar: La doctrina para la sección de ejecución y protección de la política comercial de la UE es utilizar sus mecanismos formales de queja para desafiar las barreras comerciales desleales⁵.
• Personalización para EL CASO VALVE: El modelo se adapta para tratar las prácticas de Valve como una barrera al Mercado Único. La estrategia es buscar en la base de datos de barreras comerciales cualquier queja previa presentada por empresas o asociaciones de consumidores contra las prácticas de geo-bloqueo o las comisiones de las plataformas digitales. El objetivo es encontrar precedentes de cómo la Comisión ha tratado estas barreras internas. Esto puede proporcionar argumentos adicionales para nuestra comunicación con la Comisión Europea y para demostrar que las prácticas de Valve no son un mero problema de competencia, sino una fragmentación del mercado único digital que la UE se ha comprometido a eliminar.

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5. & 6. Searchlinks: https://cocoo.uk/2025/06/19/www-investegate/ y https://www.investegate.co.uk/advanced-search

• El Modelo Estándar: El modelo para Investegate es usar su plataforma para monitorizar los anuncios del Regulatory News Service (RNS) de las empresas que cotizan en el Reino Unido, utilizando alertas y búsquedas avanzadas para rastrear acciones corporativas⁶.
• Personalización para EL CASO VALVE: Valve es una empresa privada, por lo que no aparecerá en el RNS. Sin embargo, la mayoría de los grandes editores de videojuegos (Ubisoft, Electronic Arts, Take-Two) y sus competidores (Microsoft, Sony) sí cotizan en bolsa (en EE.UU. o Europa). La estrategia es utilizar Investegate para monitorizar a cualquier editor de juegos que cotice en Londres. Buscaremos cualquier anuncio que mencione a “Valve”, “Steam”, “distribución digital” o “comisiones de plataforma”. El objetivo es capturar cualquier comentario que estas empresas hagan a sus inversores sobre su relación comercial con Steam, los costes que les supone la plataforma o las dinámicas competitivas del mercado. Esta es una fuente clave de inteligencia de la industria.