PROYECTO DE CONTRATACION PUBLICA – CASO VALVE

                           

PROYECTO DE CONTRATACION PUBLICA – CASO VALVE

     MEDIA CAMPAIGN   [COMMUNICATIONS]
 

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UK TENDERS

The UK system, primarily managed through the Crown Commercial Service (CCS), offers several routes to market. Our strategy should be twofold: first, to secure a place on broader, long-term procurement systems like Dynamic Purchasing Systems (DPS) and Frameworks; and second, to identify specific, short-term contract opportunities.

Upon searching the UK portals, it is clear that our most strategic entry point is to become a supplier on a relevant Dynamic Purchasing System. A DPS is particularly well-suited to our model because, unlike traditional frameworks, suppliers can apply to join at any time. This allows us flexibility and removes the pressure of a single, high-stakes tender application. I have identified the “Management Consultancy Framework 4” (MCF4) as a key opportunity. This is a new CCS framework, and while the initial window for applications may be set, these large frameworks often have routes to add suppliers or have specific lots that align with our services. Within this, categories such as “Business Strategy and Transformation” and “Complex and Financial Advisory Services” offer a suitable umbrella under which we can position our unique services related to regulatory failure and economic impact assessment. The process would involve registering on the CCS portal and submitting a detailed application demonstrating our capabilities.

Another crucial and immediately accessible route is the “G-Cloud 13” framework. While typically associated with cloud technology, its service categories are broad and include consultancy, or what it terms “Cloud Support.” We could position our analytical services, such as the “Non-Visible Wealth Impact Assessment (NVWIA) Toolkit,” as a specialised cloud support service for public bodies like the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) or other regulators needing to analyse complex digital market data. The advantage of G-Cloud is its simplified application process and the direct nature of the call-off contracts made through its Digital Marketplace. Suppliers can update their offerings periodically, and the framework is designed for public bodies to find and procure specialised services efficiently. The time limit for applying to G-Cloud is typically during a specific window each year, so it is imperative that we monitor the CCS website for the announcement of G-Cloud 14 and prepare our service definitions in advance.

In terms of specific, time-limited tenders, my search on Contracts Finder and Find a Tender did not yield an open contract for the exact niche service we propose. This is expected and validates our strategy. Government bodies do not currently have a defined “need” for investigating their own regulatory shortfalls in the way we have framed it. Our pressure campaign is designed to create this very need.

However, I did find a relevant tender published by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) for the provision of “Economic and Financial Advisory Services to support competition and consumer protection investigations.” The deadline for this opportunity is in late July 2025. While this is a high-value, competitive tender, submitting a bid for a specific lot within it would serve several purposes. It would formally register our expertise with the CMA, our primary UK target. It would also allow us to present our unique methodologies as part of a formal submission. Even if our bid is not successful, it places COCOO on the CMA’s radar as an entity with specialist capabilities in this domain, making a future low-value, direct award more justifiable for them.

Therefore, our immediate actions should be to begin the application process to join the Management Consultancy DPS and to prepare our service definitions for the next iteration of the G-Cloud framework. Concurrently, we must prepare a high-quality, targeted proposal for the CMA’s Economic and Financial Advisory Services tender, focusing on a niche area where our expertise is most pronounced, to be submitted before its July deadline.

EU TENDERS

Primero, es importante clarificar la función de las plataformas que ha proporcionado. Tenders Electronic Daily (TED) es el portal central y la versión en línea del Suplemento del Diario Oficial de la UE; aquí es donde se publican todos los anuncios de licitaciones públicas y, por tanto, será el foco de nuestra búsqueda. Las otras herramientas, como SIMAP, eCertis y el Documento Europeo Único de Contratación (DEUC), son recursos para entender los procedimientos y preparar la documentación necesaria para una licitación, pero no son portales para buscar ofertas activas.

He realizado una búsqueda exhaustiva en la base de datos de TED utilizando una serie de palabras clave estratégicas en inglés, el idioma predominante en la contratación de la UE. Los términos de búsqueda incluyeron “competition policy”, “digital markets study”, “legal services competition law” y “consumer protection framework”. La búsqueda se centró en procedimientos abiertos de la Comisión Europea, en particular de direcciones generales como la DG de Competencia (DG COMP) y la DG de Mercado Interior (DG GROW).

Al igual que en el caso español, es improbable encontrar una licitación que se corresponda exactamente con nuestra Propuesta No Solicitada (USP), ya que nuestra estrategia se basa precisamente en la premisa de que las instituciones aún no han reconocido la necesidad de nuestras soluciones especializadas. Sin embargo, la búsqueda ha revelado varias categorías de contratos marco y licitaciones de servicios que representan oportunidades estratégicas para COCOO.

Una oportunidad recurrente y de gran relevancia son los Contratos Marco para la prestación de servicios de evaluación económica y jurídica en el ámbito de la política de competencia. La DG de Competencia de la Comisión Europea suele abrir estos procedimientos cada pocos años para crear una lista de expertos y consultorías cualificadas a las que puede encargar rápidamente estudios e informes específicos. Aunque el plazo para el último gran acuerdo marco en esta área puede haber cerrado, es crucial vigilar la apertura del siguiente. Participar en una de estas licitaciones nos permitiría entrar en el selecto grupo de proveedores de la Comisión. Esto nos daría acceso a solicitudes de “contratos específicos” de menor cuantía que se adjudican directamente a las empresas del marco, lo cual se alinea perfectamente con nuestra estrategia. Debemos preparar la documentación para estar listos en cuanto se anuncie el próximo procedimiento, que suele tener un plazo de preparación de entre 30 y 40 días.

Otra categoría relevante son las licitaciones para estudios de evaluación de impacto. Por ejemplo, la Comisión Europea publica regularmente licitaciones para evaluar los efectos de una directiva existente o para analizar el impacto potencial de una nueva regulación en el ámbito del mercado único digital o la protección del consumidor. He localizado un estudio reciente sobre el comportamiento de los consumidores en los mercados en línea, cuyo plazo ya ha finalizado, pero que sirve como modelo del tipo de contrato al que podríamos optar. Estos contratos suelen tener un plazo de presentación de 35 días desde su publicación en TED. Nuestra estrategia sería monitorizar TED diariamente para identificar una licitación de estudio relevante, por ejemplo, sobre “la eficacia de los remedios en los casos de abuso de posición dominante en plataformas digitales”, y adaptar rápidamente nuestra propuesta para ajustarnos a sus especificaciones, introduciendo sutilmente nuestros conceptos de análisis.

Finalmente, el Parlamento Europeo también publica licitaciones para la elaboración de informes y “briefings” para sus comités, como el comité IMCO o ECON. Estas suelen ser de menor valor y con plazos más cortos, a menudo de unas cuatro semanas. Una licitación típica podría ser “Un análisis de las barreras a la competencia en el sector de los videojuegos en la UE”. Ganar un contrato de este tipo, aunque sea pequeño, nos proporcionaría una plataforma de gran influencia para presentar nuestras conclusiones directamente a los responsables políticos, reforzando así nuestra campaña de presión.

En conclusión, la vigilancia activa de TED es fundamental. No hemos encontrado una licitación abierta que sea un ajuste perfecto en este preciso momento, lo que refuerza la necesidad de nuestra campaña de incidencia para crearla. Sin embargo, hemos identificado los tipos de procedimientos recurrentes a los que debemos estar preparados para responder con agilidad. Nuestra tarea inmediata es preparar un dosier de cualificación estándar para COCOO, de modo que cuando una licitación marco o un estudio relevante sea publicado, podamos preparar y presentar una oferta sólida dentro de los plazos habituales de 30 a 40 días.

ESP TENDERS:

El portal principal, la Plataforma de Contratación del Sector Público, es el recurso central para esta tarea. El Registro Oficial de Licitadores (ROLECE) es un registro de empresas y no un portal para buscar licitaciones activas.

Mi búsqueda se centró en palabras clave como “consultoría de competencia”, “servicios jurídicos de mercados digitales”, “estudios de impacto económico”, y “supervisión regulatoria”.

Actualmente, no existen licitaciones abiertas que soliciten explícitamente un “marco de aseguramiento para fallos regulatorios” o un “análisis del impacto de la riqueza no visible”, ya que estos son los conceptos únicos que fundamentan nuestra Propuesta No Solicitada (USP). La ausencia de estas licitaciones es, en sí misma, una validación de nuestra estrategia: el sector público aún no ha formalizado la necesidad de la solución que nosotros ofrecemos, y es el objetivo de nuestra campaña de presión crear esa necesidad.

No obstante, he identificado las siguientes categorías de licitaciones recurrentes que nos ofrecen una vía de entrada estratégica:

  1. Acuerdos Marco para Servicios de Consultoría Jurídica y Económica: Varios ministerios y organismos reguladores, incluida la CNMC y el Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital, publican periódicamente Acuerdos Marco para la homologación de empresas de consultoría. Inscribir a COCOO en estos acuerdos, aunque no garantiza un contrato, nos posicionaría como un proveedor cualificado y nos daría visibilidad directa de futuras licitaciones de bajo valor que a menudo se adjudican directamente entre las empresas del marco. Estos acuerdos son nuestra oportunidad más estratégica a mediano plazo.

  2. Contratos Menores de Estudios Específicos: Con frecuencia, se publican contratos de servicios por debajo del umbral de licitación pública (~15,000 euros) para la elaboración de informes o estudios sobre temas muy concretos. Por ejemplo, un estudio sobre “la competencia en las plataformas de comercio electrónico” o “el impacto de la nueva Ley de Mercados Digitales en las pymes”. Aunque no son nuestro caso exacto, nos permitirían presentar una oferta, demostrar nuestra experiencia y, una vez dentro, utilizarla como plataforma para presentar nuestras soluciones más avanzadas.

  3. Licitaciones de Asistencia Técnica para la Protección del Consumidor: Organismos como el Ministerio de Consumo a veces licitan servicios de asistencia técnica para evaluar el impacto de ciertas prácticas comerciales en los consumidores. Podríamos enmarcar el daño causado por Valve como un problema de protección al consumidor, ajustando nuestra propuesta para responder a una de estas licitaciones y establecer una relación contractual.

En resumen, no hay una licitación “perfecta” esperándonos. Nuestro camino, tal como lo diseñamos, es utilizar la presión mediática y política para forzar a un organismo como la CNMC a reconocer un fallo sistémico. Cuando se vean obligados a “hacer algo”, su primera acción lógica será encargar un “estudio de viabilidad” o un “informe de diagnóstico”, que es exactamente la licitación de bajo valor que nuestra Propuesta No Solicitada está diseñada para satisfacer. Nuestra tarea ahora es continuar con la campaña de presión para generar esa oportunidad contractual.

 Relevant NACE/SIC sectors and types of companies

To effectively build our case and identify potential class members and collaborators, it is crucial to map out the commercial landscape in which Valve operates. This involves identifying the specific market sectors, the key corporate players within those sectors, and their potential status as competitors, business users, or collaborators who have been impacted by Valve’s anti-competitive practices.

Based on an analysis of the provided regulatory classification documents, Valve’s activities fall under several key economic codes. Within the European Union’s NACE framework, the most relevant classification is J58.21, “Publishing of computer games,” supplemented by J62.01, “Computer programming activities,” and J63.11, covering the data processing and hosting activities essential to a digital distribution platform like Steam. The corresponding UK SIC codes are 58.21 and 62.01, covering game publishing and software development respectively. From a financial market perspective, under the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), these activities are situated within the Technology and Media supersectors, specifically in industries such as “Software and Computer Services” and “Broadcasting & Entertainment.”

Using these classifications, we can identify several categories of companies in the European, UK, and Spanish markets that have been directly affected by Valve’s conduct.

1. Competing Digital Distribution Platforms

These entities are direct competitors to Steam and are harmed by practices such as MFN clauses that prevent them from competing on price. Their involvement could be crucial in demonstrating the foreclosure effects of Valve’s market power.

Epic Games, Inc. is arguably Steam’s most significant global competitor through its Epic Games Store. As a private entity, it has been vocal in its opposition to Steam’s 30% commission and has used timed exclusives to attract users. Epic’s legal and business development teams are key contacts for collaboration. A relevant email for support inquiries, which can often be rerouted for business matters, is help@support.epicgames.com.

GOG.com, owned by the Polish company CD Projekt S.A., is another key competitor. It differentiates itself by offering games without digital rights management (DRM). As GOG’s parent company is a major publisher itself, it has a unique perspective on Valve’s dominance. The appropriate contact point would be CD Projekt’s investor relations. Their ISIN code is PLOPTTC00011 and their investor relations email is ir@cdprojekt.com.

2. Major European Publishers and Developers

These companies are business users of Steam and are directly impacted by the 30% commission fee and restrictive contractual terms. While some are large enough to have significant bargaining power, many are still beholden to Valve’s platform to reach the market.

Ubisoft Entertainment SA, a major French publisher, operates its own platform (Ubisoft Connect) but still relies heavily on Steam for distribution. This dual role as a competitor and a business user makes them a key party of interest. Their ISIN code is FR0000054470. Their investor relations team can be a point of contact to understand the impact of Valve’s policies on major publishers.

Embracer Group AB is a large Swedish holding company that owns a vast portfolio of developers and publishers (such as THQ Nordic and Gearbox). Their diverse holdings mean they have extensive experience with Steam’s distribution terms across many different types of games. Their B share ISIN code is SE0023615885 and their investor relations contact is oscar.erixon@embracer.com.

3. UK Publishers and Developers

The UK has a vibrant development scene, with many companies reliant on Steam. These entities represent a significant group of potential class members for a business-focused claim regarding lost revenue.

Team17 Group PLC is a UK-based publisher and developer with a long history in the industry. As a publicly traded company, they are accountable to shareholders and would be concerned with any practices that unfairly reduce their revenue margins. While a direct email was not found, their investor relations page on the London Stock Exchange is the appropriate channel for formal inquiries.

Frontier Developments PLC, another key UK developer and publisher, is also publicly listed on the London StockExchange. They specialise in simulation games and have a significant presence on Steam. Their financial PR adviser, Teneo, can be reached at frontier@teneo.com.

4. Spanish Developers

Spanish game developers represent a core group of affected business users in the jurisdiction central to our initial complaint with the CNMC. They are subject to Valve’s high commissions and restrictive terms, which impacts their profitability and ability to invest in new projects.

MercurySteam Entertainment S.L. is a well-known Spanish developer behind several successful international titles. As a private company, they are directly affected by the terms imposed by platform holders like Valve. Their general contact email is info@mercurysteam.com.

Tequila Works S.L., based in Madrid, is another prominent Spanish developer. They would have direct experience with Steam’s publishing and distribution agreements. Their general contact email is info@tequilaworks.com.

By engaging with these different categories of companies, we can build a comprehensive picture of the harm caused by Valve’s practices. The platform competitors can provide evidence of market foreclosure, while the publishers and developers in Europe, the UK, and Spain can provide direct testimony and data on the financial impact of the commission structure and restrictive clauses. This multi-pronged approach will be essential in substantiating our claims and building a robust class action.

 To effectively define our target class members and identify harmed competitors, we must be precise about the specific services and commercial practices of Valve Corporation that form the subject matter of our legal actions. The entire case revolves around Valve’s operation of its dominant PC gaming platform, Steam, which functions as a digital storefront and a broader ecosystem for the distribution and playing of video games.

Our causes of action stem from several distinct, yet interconnected, anti-competitive conducts facilitated by this platform.

First, we have the historical practice of geo-blocking. This service, provided by Valve at the request of certain game publishers, involved using Steam’s technical infrastructure to create and enforce territorial restrictions on software activation keys. A key purchased in a lower-priced country, for instance, could not be activated by a consumer in a higher-priced country. This directly prevented cross-border sales and partitioned the European single market, allowing for sustained price discrimination. This conduct, which the European Commission has already found to be illegal, forms the basis of a strong follow-on damages claim for consumers who were denied the opportunity to purchase games at more competitive prices.

Second, and central to the ongoing harm, are the restrictive terms within Valve’s Steam Distribution Agreement—the contract that all publishers and developers must accept to place their games on the platform. We allege this agreement contains abusive clauses that stifle competition. A primary example is the Platform Parity Obligation, also known as a Most-Favored-Nation clause. This contractual service term effectively forbids developers from selling their own game for a lower price on any competing platform, such as the Epic Games Store, GOG, or even their own websites. This prevents rival stores from competing with Steam on price, thereby creating an artificially high price floor across the entire PC games market.

Third, we are targeting the commission structure itself as an abusive service. Valve levies what we argue is a supracompetitive 30% commission on every game sale and in-game transaction. In a competitive market, such a high fee would not be sustainable. However, due to Steam’s dominance and the aforementioned parity clauses that prevent price competition, this 30% fee has become a de facto industry tax, the cost of which is borne by both developers, through reduced margins, and consumers, through inflated retail prices for games and content.

Finally, our action concerns the tying of services within the Steam ecosystem. Valve mandates that any in-game content, such as downloadable content (DLC) or virtual items, for a game sold on Steam must also be sold through Steam’s own payment processing system. This prevents developers from using alternative, potentially cheaper, payment providers and steers all revenue through Valve’s high-commission tollgate. This practice forecloses competition in the market for payment processing services related to PC gaming.

In essence, while the product is video games, the subject matter of our action is Valve’s suite of anti-competitive distribution, contractual, and financial services that distort the market, harm consumers, and suppress competition

Primarily, NACE 58.21 – Publishing of computer games and NACE 47.91 – Retail sale via mail order houses or via Internet (when applied to digital game sales) are central to Valve’s Steam platform. Companies in these sectors are direct competitors or key players in the ecosystem.

In Europe, significant competitors to Steam in the PC game digital distribution space include GOG.com (CD Projekt Group), which focuses on DRM-free games and has a strong presence. Their website is www.gog.com. Another major competitor is the Epic Games Store, run by Epic Games, which has gained market share through aggressive pricing, developer incentives, and exclusive titles. Their website is store.epicgames.com. Other platforms include EA’s Origin/EA App (www.ea.com/ea-app) and Ubisoft’s Ubisoft Connect (formerly Uplay) (ubisoftconnect.com), though these are more focused on their own published titles. In Spain, these platforms operate and would be key points of comparison. Many smaller independent online game stores also exist, often specializing in indie games or specific genres.

For companies involved in NACE 62.01 – Computer programming activities (game development), these would be the developers who use Steam to publish their games. They are collaborators in the sense that they populate the Steam platform but could also be seen as being subject to Valve’s commission rates and platform policies. Identifying individual game developers in Spain or Europe would involve looking at directories from national or regional game developer associations. For example, DEV (Desarrollo Español de Videojuegos) in Spain (www.dev.org.es) has a member directory or reports listing Spanish game development studios. Contacting such studios directly via their websites would be the way to explore their experiences with Steam.

Regarding NACE 77.4 – Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, except copyrighted works and NACE 77.2 – Rental and Leasing of Other Intellectual Property and Similar Products, this relates more to the underlying business model of licensing games for distribution on platforms like Steam. The key players here are the game publishers themselves, who license their IP to Valve for sale on Steam. Major international publishers like Electronic Arts, Ubisoft, Activision Blizzard, Take-Two Interactive, Square Enix, Bandai Namco, Capcom, etc., all have significant European operations and would be involved in such licensing. Many of these were also part of the European Commission’s investigation into geo-blocking alongside Valve. Contacting their European headquarters or specific Spanish offices (if they exist) would be through their official corporate websites.

To find lists of companies within these NACE/CNAE codes specifically in Spain, resources like commercial B2B databases (some of which we’ve discussed, often requiring subscription but sometimes offering limited free searches or trials) are typically the most direct route for generating filtered lists. As previously noted, the Spanish company register (registradores.org) and its open data portal (opendata.registradores.org) hold this information, though extracting filterable lists for free can be complex.

When reaching out to these potential competitors or collaborators (especially game developers or publishers who might feel aggrieved by Valve’s terms but are reliant on Steam), the approach should be tailored.

  • For competing platforms like GOG or Epic Games Store, the interest might be in understanding how they perceive Steam’s market practices and whether they see Valve’s conduct (e.g., alleged price parity clauses, high commissions) as a barrier to fairer competition. Their legal or business development departments, accessible via their corporate websites, would be the initial points of contact.
  • For game developers and smaller publishers in Spain (found via associations like DEV), the interest would be in gathering evidence of how Valve’s policies (commissions, discoverability, restrictive terms) affect them and whether they would support actions aimed at creating a fairer platform ecosystem. Direct outreach to studios listed in industry directories would be necessary.

Thank you for providing such a comprehensive and detailed overview of Valve Corporation’s activities in Europe, particularly in the Spanish market, as it relates to the ongoing anti-competitive concerns. Based on your focus on the **Steam digital distribution platform**, its associated products, services, and the specific issues surrounding **geo-blocking**, **anti-competitive pricing**, **commission rates**, and **restrictive platform policies**, I can assist in identifying relevant NACE sectors that best align with Valve’s operations and the associated potential market dynamics. Below, I’ll propose several NACE sectors that are relevant to the products, services, and allegations discussed, ordered by their relevance: — ### 1. **NACE Sector 58.2 – Software Publishing** **Description:** This sector covers the publishing of software products, including the distribution and licensing of software. It encompasses publishers of video games and other digital content, as well as firms involved in the creation, marketing, and distribution of interactive video game software. **Metadata:** – **Code:** 58.2 – **Description:** The publishing of software, including video games. – **Key Services:** Distribution of video games and add-on content, including digital formats, online platforms, and digital rights management. – **Relevance:** Steam operates as a **digital distribution platform** for PC video games and related content, essentially acting as a publisher and distributor in this sector. Valve’s involvement in the geo-blocking of keys and its role in imposing restrictive terms on developers aligns closely with this sector. ### 2. **NACE Sector 77.4 – Leasing of Intellectual Property and Similar Products, Except Copyrighted Works** **Description:** This sector includes leasing or licensing intellectual property rights, including patents, trademarks, and software licenses. It includes activities related to the licensing of software and digital goods. **Metadata:** – **Code:** 77.4 – **Description:** Leasing and licensing of intellectual property and software products. – **Key Services:** Licensing of software platforms like Steam, and other digital content that may be subject to restrictive practices, including platform parity obligations and high commission rates. – **Relevance:** Steam’s **commission structure** and the contractual obligations between Valve and game developers/publishers often revolve around the **licensing of content** to the platform, which is why this sector is relevant for understanding Valve’s role in the digital ecosystem. ### 3. **NACE Sector 47.91 – Retail Sale of Music and Video Recordings in Specialized Stores** **Description:** This sector deals with the retail sale of digital video games and media. While primarily focused on physical media, it can extend to the online sale of digital games. **Metadata:** – **Code:** 47.91 – **Description:** Retail sale of media, including digital games and other entertainment content. – **Key Services:** Distribution of digital video games, including the sale of downloadable content (DLC) and digital activation keys. – **Relevance:** While Valve’s business model operates predominantly through digital distribution, the **retail sale of video games** (whether through platforms like Steam or via other digital means) is relevant when considering the competition Valve faces from other digital retailers. This includes platforms such as GOG, Epic Games Store, and other digital video game distributors. ### 4. **NACE Sector 77.2 – Rental and Leasing of Other Intellectual Property and Similar Products** **Description:** This sector concerns the **leasing and licensing** of content and intellectual property, similar to **NACE 77.4** but may involve content in addition to software (such as digital game content, video game licenses, etc.). **Metadata:** – **Code:** 77.2 – **Description:** Leasing and licensing of other intellectual properties and digital content. – **Key Services:** Licensing of video games, digital content, and other related items on an ongoing basis through a platform like Steam. – **Relevance:** This sector is relevant when considering the **subscription model** that Valve uses through its platform for ongoing access to content and for leveraging IP rights associated with games, DLC, and other digital goods. ### 5. **NACE Sector 62.01 – Computer Programming Activities** **Description:** This sector includes the development of computer software, including game development and the creation of related platforms. **Metadata:** – **Code:** 62.01 – **Description:** The programming and development of software applications, including video games. – **Key Services:** Development of software, including video games, and related services. – **Relevance:** While Valve is not directly a game developer, its ecosystem facilitates the **development** and **distribution** of video games via Steam. This sector’s relevance arises in the context of the **Steam platform’s role** in enabling developers to publish and distribute their games. — ### Additional Considerations Based on the information you provided, these NACE sectors would be the most relevant for understanding Valve’s business activities in the **digital game distribution** space and the competitive dynamics in the market, particularly in relation to the **alleged anti-competitive behaviors** such as geo-blocking, restrictive contractual obligations, and excessive pricing. Given the focus on **digital platforms**, **intellectual property licensing**, and **software publishing**, these sectors address the core operational model of Valve and provide insight into the potential market forces at play. If you would like, we can explore the relevant **competitors** or **alternative platforms** in more detail, based on these sectors, or we can delve into any other aspects of your analysis that need refinement. Let me know how you’d like to proceed!

 

To **identify potential competitors or collaborators** for **Valve Corporation España** in the European market, we begin by identifying companies operating within the **most relevant NACE sectors** previously determined. These sectors reflect the **nature of Valve’s regional activity**, notably around **digital distribution (Steam)**, **software and platform support**, **localization**, and **regional marketing**. — ## 🎯 Focus Sectors for Competitor/Collaborator Mapping | Rank | NACE Code | Description | |——|———–|————-| | 1 | **62.01** | *Computer programming activities* | | 2 | **63.12** | *Web portals* | | 3 | **73.11** | *Advertising agencies* | | 4 | **74.30** | *Translation and interpretation activities* | | 5 | **82.99** | *Other business support service activities n.e.c.* | — ## 🔍 European Companies in Overlapping Sectors Below is a curated list of **major companies operating in one or more of these sectors** across Europe, indicating potential **competitors**, **partners**, or **collaborators** to Valve Corporation España: — ### 1. **CD PROJEKT S.A. (Poland)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 63.12 – **Why Relevant**: Developer and publisher of digital games; operates **GOG.com**, a digital storefront similar to Steam. – **Potential Role**: **Direct competitor** in digital distribution; potential **collaborator** on joint industry initiatives or DRM-free distribution. — ### 2. **Ubisoft Entertainment S.A. (France)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 63.12, 73.11 – **Why Relevant**: Game development and publishing; operates **Ubisoft Connect** (digital distribution platform); manages regional marketing teams. – **Potential Role**: **Competitor** in publishing and platform services; may **collaborate** in industry regulatory discussions or on tech standards. — ### 3. **Paradox Interactive AB (Sweden)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 63.12 – **Why Relevant**: Focuses on publishing strategy games with own launcher and localization. – **Potential Role**: **Competitor** with direct consumer platforms; potential **collaborator** on localization or PC gaming market insights. — ### 4. **Epic Games International S.à.r.l. (Luxembourg)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 63.12 – **Why Relevant**: Operates **Epic Games Store**, a direct Steam competitor. – **Potential Role**: **Direct competitor** in digital distribution and developer support ecosystems. — ### 5. **Wargaming Group Limited (Cyprus)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 63.12, 74.30 – **Why Relevant**: Online gaming company with strong regional presence and emphasis on localization. – **Potential Role**: **Competitor** in online multiplayer platforms; **collaborator** for regional events or shared language services. — ### 6. **Keywords Studios plc (Ireland)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 74.30, 62.01, 82.99 – **Why Relevant**: Specializes in game localization, QA, art, audio, and support services. – **Potential Role**: **Key collaborator** for **localization and QA** services in Spain and other European markets. — ### 7. **Alconost Inc. (European branch)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 74.30 – **Why Relevant**: Focuses on game and app localization across multiple European languages. – **Potential Role**: **Collaborator** or subcontractor for **Spanish localization** of Valve titles or platform content. — ### 8. **Virtuos Games (Spain & France)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 62.01, 74.30 – **Why Relevant**: Offers development support, porting, and localization. – **Potential Role**: **Collaborator** on technical adaptation of games for local markets. — ### 9. **The Social Chain AG (Germany)** – **Relevant NACE Codes**: 73.11 – **Why Relevant**: A digital marketing firm specializing in influencer and gaming campaigns. – **Potential Role**: **Collaborator** for regional marketing campaigns on behalf of Steam or Valve titles. — ## 🧭 Summary Table | Company | Country | NACE Sectors | Potential Relationship | |———|———|————–|————————–| | CD PROJEKT S.A. | Poland | 62.01, 63.12 | Competitor / Collaborator | | Ubisoft S.A. | France | 62.01, 63.12, 73.11 | Competitor / Collaborator | | Paradox Interactive AB | Sweden | 62.01, 63.12 | Competitor / Collaborator | | Epic Games Intl. | Luxembourg | 62.01, 63.12 | **Direct Competitor** | | Wargaming Ltd | Cyprus | 62.01, 63.12, 74.30 | Competitor / Collaborator | | Keywords Studios plc | Ireland | 74.30, 62.01, 82.99 | **Primary Collaborator** | | Alconost Inc. | EU | 74.30 | Collaborator | | Virtuos | Spain/France | 62.01, 74.30 | Collaborator | | Social Chain AG | Germany | 73.11 | Collaborator | — ## ✅ Next Steps Would you like to: – Explore **specific companies in Spain** under these NACE codes? – Get a **map of partnerships or supply chain overlaps** in EU? – Analyze **Valve S.a.r.l. Luxembourg** to compare regional operations? Let me know how deep you’d like to go into each category.

 

 

Based on your request to identify companies with similar NACE and SIC code combinations to Valve Corporation Europe, I’ve compiled a list of notable companies operating in the video game publishing, development, and online platform sectors. These companies share activities such as video game publishing (NACE 58.21), software development (NACE 62.10), online platform operation (NACE 60.39), and data hosting services (NACE 63.10)

🎮 Notable Companies in Video Game Publishing and Development

  1. Square Enix Limited
    • Location: London, UK
    • Activities: Video game publishing and development
    • NACE/SIC Codes: 58.21 / 62011, 62012
    • Overview: A major publisher known for franchises like Final Fantasy and Tomb Raider, operating globally with a significant presence in Europe.
  2. Ubisoft SRL
    • Location: Bucharest, Romania
    • Activities: Game development and publishing
    • NACE Code: 62.01
    • Overview: A leading game developer and publisher with multiple studios worldwide, known for titles like Assassin’s Creed and Far Cry.
  3. Kwalee Ltd.
    • Location: Leamington Spa, UK
    • Activities: Mobile and console game development and publishing
    • NACE/SIC Codes: 58.21 / 62011
    • Overview: Specializes in hyper-casual games with over 700 million downloads; operates globally with offices in the UK, India, China, and Portugal. (en.wikipedia.org)

🌐 Companies in Online Gaming Platforms and Data Hosting

  1. Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited
    • Location: London, UK
    • Activities: Online gaming platform operation, game publishing
    • NACE/SIC Codes: 60.39 / 62090
    • Overview: Operates the PlayStation Network, offering digital game distribution and online multiplayer services.
  2. Amazon Development Center (Romania) SRL
    • Location: Iași, Romania
    • Activities: Software development, cloud services
    • NACE Code: 62.01
    • Overview: Focuses on developing technologies for Amazon’s cloud services, which support online gaming platforms.
  3. Cognizant Technology Solutions Romania SRL
    • Location: Cluj, Romania
    • Activities: IT services, software development
    • NACE Code: 62.01
    • Overview: Provides IT consulting and software development services, including for gaming industry clients.

🆕 Emerging Companies in Game Publishing and Development

  1. Aicos Studio Ltd
    • Location: London, UK
    • Activities: Video game publishing and development
    • NACE/SIC Codes: 58.21 / 62011
    • Overview: A recently established company focusing on interactive leisure and entertainment software. (ukcompanydir.com)
  2. Undeads Interactive Limited
    • Location: London, UK
    • Activities: Game publishing, software development, web portals
    • NACE/SIC Codes: 58.21 / 62011, 62012, 63120
    • Overview: Engages in publishing computer games and developing business and domestic software, including web portal activities. (ukcompanydir.com)

For Valve Corporation Europe—whose activities include video game publishing (e.g., Steam), development, distribution via digital platforms, community management, localization, and online services—the following NACE Rev. 2.1 and SBI 2025 (Dutch) codes are most applicable:

🎮 Primary Activity: Video Game Publishing & Platform Services

✅ NACE Rev. 2.1:

  • 58.21 — Publishing of video games
    Includes:
  • Publishing of video games for all platforms and devices
  • Provision of in-game/in-app purchases
  • Intermediation services for video game software publishing
    Excludes:
  • Software development on behalf of others (→ 62.10)
  • Online game hosting not associated with publishing (→ 60.39)
  • 60.39 — Operation of online gaming/video game sites (not associated with publishing)
    Includes:

    • Running online video game sites and content-sharing platforms
      Excludes:
    • Video game publishing (→ 58.21)
    • Game development on behalf of others (→ 62.10)
    • Application hosting (→ 63.10)
  • 62.10 — Computer programming activities
    Includes:

    • Development of video game software, apps, and middleware
    • Customising and maintaining games or software
  • 63.10 — Data processing, hosting, cloud services
    Includes:

    • Hosting services (e.g., Steam backend/cloud)
    • Infrastructure for game streaming, data centres

✅ SBI 2025 (Dutch Equivalent)

Based on direct alignment with NACE:

  • 58.21 — Uitgeverijen van videospellen
  • 60.39 — Beheer van online gameplatforms (niet gepaard met uitgave)
  • 62.10 — Ontwikkeling van computersoftware, inclusief games
  • 63.10 — Hosting- en data-infrastructuurdiensten

📞 Secondary Activities: Support, Localization, Community Management

These may occur as auxiliary services to core publishing/platform functions:

  • 82.20 — Call centre activities (e.g. customer support)
    SBI 2025: 82.20 – Klantenservice via callcenters
  • 74.20 — Translation and interpretation activities
    SBI 2025: 74.20 – Vertaal- en tolkdiensten
  • 63.91 — Web search portal activities (if Steam Search or similar functions are managed)
    SBI 2025: 63.91 – Webportalen en informatiezoekdiensten
  • 63.92 — Market and user data aggregation (if analytics tools or community feedback tools used)
    SBI 2025: 63.92 – Informatieverzameling en -analyse

🇺🇸 For SIC (U.S. Classification System)

Valve’s activities broadly correspond to:

  • 7372 — Prepackaged Software (incl. game software publishing)
  • 7371 — Custom Computer Programming Services
  • 7379 — Computer Related Services, n.e.c. (e.g. online platforms, hosting)

 for “Valve Corporation España”, YOU EARLIER recommended the following **most relevant NACE sector classifications**, ordered by **relevance** with explanations: — ### **1. NACE Code: 62.01 – Computer programming activities** **Description**: *This class includes the writing, modifying, testing and supporting of software.* **Justification**: While the Spanish entity is unlikely to engage in original software development, the core product and service offered by Valve (primarily Steam) is a software platform. If any part of the Spanish operation involves software-related functions—such as localization testing, QA, integration of localized builds, or support of regional adaptations—this would justify alignment with this class. Furthermore, from a NACE perspective, support functions closely tied to software platforms may fall under this category even if not involved in primary development. — ### **2. NACE Code: 63.12 – Web portals** **Description**: *This class includes the operation of websites that use a search engine to generate and maintain extensive databases of Internet addresses and content in an easily searchable format. Other websites act as portals to the Internet, such as media sites providing periodically updated content. Also included is the operation of sites that provide online gaming platforms (multiplayer or otherwise).* **Justification**: Steam is a global online distribution platform that qualifies as a “web portal” under this definition, especially given its digital storefront, content aggregation, and social/community features. Even if the Spanish office primarily localizes or supports the operation of this web portal in the Spanish market (rather than developing it), this class remains highly relevant. — ### **3. NACE Code: 73.11 – Advertising agencies** **Description**: *This class includes the creation of advertising campaigns and placement in media, including localization and market adaptation of global campaigns.* **Justification**: If the Spanish entity coordinates or executes localized marketing, advertising, and public relations efforts (either in-house or via agencies), then this code would be applicable. Your assessment suggests likely collaboration with local marketing teams or firms for campaign adaptation, making this a secondary but plausible match. — ### **4. NACE Code: 74.30 – Translation and interpretation activities** **Description**: *This class includes translation of written material and interpretation services.* **Justification**: Given the importance of Spanish localization for both game content and platform interfaces, and assuming that Valve Corporation España plays any role in managing, executing, or QA’ing translation services—either in-house or outsourced—this code could apply. It’s not the core function, but it supports core revenue-generating activities. — ### **5. NACE Code: 82.99 – Other business support service activities n.e.c.** **Description**: *This class includes the provision of business support services not elsewhere classified. Examples include telephone answering services, translation coordination, or general office support.* **Justification**: If the Spanish presence is minimal and primarily administrative—serving a support role without direct product or marketing execution—then this catch-all code might apply. It would reflect a liaison or representative office structure. — ### Recommendation Summary | Rank | NACE Code | Description | Relevance Rationale | |——|———–|—————————————————–|———————| | 1 | **62.01** | Computer programming activities | Closest fit to digital platform support activities | | 2 | **63.12** | Web portals | Reflects Steam as a digital platform/local portal support | | 3 | **73.11** | Advertising agencies | Covers localized marketing & PR if applicable | | 4 | **74.30** | Translation and interpretation activities | Covers localization support/QA work | | 5 | **82.99** | Other business support service activities n.e.c. | For limited operational presence (e.g., administrative office) | — If further clarification becomes available—especially about the legal form or registered activity of Valve Corporation España—I can refine this classification. Let me know if you’d like the same exercise for Valve S.a.r.l. in Luxembourg.

Suggested NACE Codes

NACE Code Description
5821

Publishing of computer games

85% match
6201

Computer programming activities

80% match
6311

Data processing, hosting and related activities

70% match
7490

Other professional, scientific and technical activities n.e.c.

65% match

Valve Corporation’s primary European operational hub, often cited in legal and commercial contexts, is Valve S.a.r.l. in Luxembourg, which typically handles many pan-European functions. Therefore, any “Valve Corporation España” presence is likely to be a smaller, market-focused operation or the Spanish market may be directly served by the broader European structure.

Regarding your first question, whether “Valve Corporation España” has employees engaged in customer support or community management locally in Spain, my search indicates that Valve provides customer support for its Steam platform globally, and this support is available in multiple languages, including Spanish. It is common for large digital platform companies to centralize multilingual customer support in regional hubs or utilize a distributed workforce rather than maintaining substantial, distinct customer support centers in every single country. While there might be some individuals or small teams in Spain involved in high-level community liaison, or perhaps outsourced local language support, extensive in-house customer support teams specifically employed by a “Valve Corporation España” are not prominently evident from public information. Much of the first-line support is automated through the Steam platform itself, with more complex issues escalated. Community management is also often a mix of centralized teams and volunteer moderators from the community itself. So, while Spanish language support and community engagement exist, a large, locally employed Spanish team for these functions is not clearly indicated.

Concerning your second question, about responsibility for local marketing, promotional campaigns, or public relations activities in Spain, it’s likely that Valve Corporation, through its European structure (likely Valve S.a.r.l.), coordinates major marketing and PR efforts that would have a pan-European reach, including Spain. Specific campaigns might be localized for the Spanish market (e.g., language, culturally relevant promotions), and this could involve collaboration with local marketing agencies or a small local marketing liaison. However, a large, autonomous marketing and PR department solely within a “Valve Corporation España” is less probable than centrally managed campaigns with regional adaptations. The major promotional events on Steam, like seasonal sales, are global or at least pan-regional efforts.

For your third question, on handling legal, regulatory compliance, or contract management specific to Spain or Southern Europe, this is an area where some local presence or specialized local legal counsel would be essential. Valve Corporation, operating in Spain, must comply with Spanish laws (consumer protection, data privacy, tax, etc.) and EU regulations. While core legal strategy and major contract negotiations (e.g., with large publishers) might be handled by Valve’s main legal teams (US or Luxembourg), they would almost certainly engage Spanish legal firms for local expertise, compliance advice, and representation in any Spanish legal matters. A small in-house legal/compliance liaison role in Spain or responsible for a cluster of Southern European countries coordinated through Valve S.a.r.l. is plausible for overseeing local compliance and managing relationships with local counsel, but a full-scale, independent legal department within a “Valve Corporation España” seems unlikely.

Regarding your fourth question, about in-house localization work (e.g., translation of game content, regional adaptation) performed by a Spanish entity, Valve’s games and the Steam platform are extensively localized into Spanish. This localization process involves translation and cultural adaptation. While Valve oversees this, the actual translation work for many companies is often outsourced to specialized localization agencies or freelance translators. It’s possible Valve might have some in-house localization quality assurance or coordination roles, potentially managed from a European hub, or they might directly employ some Spanish language specialists. However, large-scale, in-house localization teams solely within a “Valve Corporation España” are less common in the industry compared to using specialized global localization providers or a centralized in-house team that handles multiple languages.

Concerning your fifth question, whether the Spanish entity generates revenue directly (e.g., through localized sales or regional partnerships) or is a cost center, Steam is a global platform that generates significant revenue from sales in Spain. These revenues are part of Valve Corporation’s global income. How Valve structures its inter-company finances for tax and accounting purposes (e.g., whether a local Spanish presence, if it formally exists as more than just a representative office, is treated as a cost center or directly books local revenue) is internal financial information that is not publicly available. Typically, for digital sales on a global platform, revenue is often booked centrally or through a designated regional corporate entity (like Valve S.a.r.l. in Luxembourg for Europe) which then might allocate operational costs to various markets. It’s plausible any minimal direct presence in Spain primarily functions as a cost center supporting the broader European operation, rather than a standalone profit-and-loss entity directly driving and booking all Spanish sales.

Finally, for your sixth question, about technical support or infrastructure maintenance (e.g., server upkeep, network support) performed in Spain, Valve operates a global network of servers for Steam, including content delivery networks (CDNs) to ensure fast downloads and good performance for users worldwide, including in Spain. It’s highly probable that Valve utilizes data centers and server capacity within Europe, some of which might be physically located in or near Spain to serve the Iberian peninsula and Southern Europe effectively. However, the direct management and primary maintenance of this core infrastructure is typically a centralized global operations function. Any “technical support” in Spain would more likely refer to customer-facing technical assistance (as discussed in Q1) or very localized IT support for any small administrative presence, rather than hands-on maintenance of the core Steam server infrastructure by a dedicated “Valve Corporation España” team.

In summary, based on publicly available information and typical operational models for global digital platform companies, a “Valve Corporation España” if it exists as a distinct operational entity, would most likely be focused on market-facing support functions such as Spanish-language customer service liaison, community engagement, marketing coordination, ensuring local legal and regulatory compliance (likely with significant reliance on external Spanish law firms), and overseeing localization efforts (which may be outsourced). Core game development, primary Steam platform operation and R&D, major financial operations, and strategic decision-making are almost certainly centralized in the US or managed through key European hubs like Valve S.a.r.l. in Luxembourg.

PROMPT: classify **VALVE CORPORATION ESPAÑA** under the appropriate **NACE sectors

ANSWER:

we first need to understand the **activities of the company**. Since the name strongly associates with **Valve Corporation**, a well-known **U.S.-based video game developer and digital distribution company**, it is reasonable to assume that **Valve Corporation España** operates as a regional or subsidiary office supporting similar activities. ### Common Activities of Valve Corporation (parent company): – Development and publishing of video games (e.g., *Half-Life*, *Portal*, *Dota 2*) – Operation of the **Steam** digital distribution platform – Software development (gaming engines, VR systems) – E-commerce and digital content distribution – Possibly R&D in immersive technology (e.g., VR hardware) — ### Most Relevant NACE Sector Suggestions (based on above activities): #### **1. NACE Code: 62.01** **Sector Description**: *Computer programming activities* **Explanation**: Covers software development for various applications, including games. As a primary activity of Valve, this is highly relevant. **Metadata**: “`json { “code”: “62.01”, “section”: “J”, “division”: “62”, “group”: “62.0”, “class”: “62.01”, “description”: “Computer programming activities” } “` — #### **2. NACE Code: 58.21** **Sector Description**: *Publishing of computer games* **Explanation**: This directly applies to companies involved in creating and publishing video games — another core function of Valve. **Metadata**: “`json { “code”: “58.21”, “section”: “J”, “division”: “58”, “group”: “58.2”, “class”: “58.21”, “description”: “Publishing of computer games” } “` — #### **3. NACE Code: 63.12** **Sector Description**: *Web portals* **Explanation**: This includes operation of web platforms such as **Steam**, Valve’s digital distribution service. If the Spanish branch is involved in managing regional distribution or platform support, this may be applicable. **Metadata**: “`json { “code”: “63.12”, “section”: “J”, “division”: “63”, “group”: “63.1”, “class”: “63.12”, “description”: “Web portals” } “` — ### Summary (Ranked by Relevance): 1. **62.01 – Computer programming activities** (if software/game development is done in Spain) 2. **58.21 – Publishing of computer games** (relevant if publishing support is handled locally) 3. **63.12 – Web portals** (if the entity is involved in platform operations like Steam) — ### Request for Confirmation: To improve precision, please confirm: – Does Valve Corporation España develop games or primarily handle distribution/support? – Does it manage any local operations of Steam? – Is there any focus on VR hardware or software R&D? With that, I can refine the classification further.

When searching for these organizations, queries such as “organizaciones de consumidores España,” “asociaciones desarrolladores videojuegos España,” or “derechos digitales España ONG” would be typical starting points. Once identified, their official websites are paramount for obtaining the correct and preferred contact details. For instance, major Spanish consumer organizations like OCU (Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios) and FACUA (Consumidores en Acción) have extensive websites with clear contact information and often details about their areas of work, allowing you to tailor your approach. Similarly, developer associations like DEV (Desarrollo Español de Videojuegos) list contact details for inquiries.

Ultimately, a combination of research to identify the right organizations, followed by a professional and tailored approach using their official contact channels (primarily their websites and the email addresses or forms provided there), is generally the most effective strategy, more so than relying on social media direct messaging for initial formal contact with organizations. The key is to clearly articulate the mutual benefit of an alliance in the Valve case—protecting Spanish consumers and businesses, upholding fair competition in the digital market, and leveraging the European Commission’s existing infringement decision for national-level redress

The European Commission’s 2021 decision against Valve primarily focused on anti-competitive agreements between Valve and five specific game publishers that restricted cross-border sales through geo-blocking of Steam activation keys, which was found to be an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

The UK class action, led by Vicki Shotbolt on behalf of UK consumers, appears to be based on broader and additional grounds, primarily alleging an abuse of dominance by Valve Corporation in the PC gaming market, which would fall under Chapter II of the UK Competition Act 1998 (the UK equivalent of Article 102 TFEU). The core allegations in that UK action that seem different from, or additional to, the EC’s specific geo-blocking findings include claims that Valve:

  1. Imposes excessive and anti-competitive prices on consumers for PC games and add-on content available on the Steam platform.
  2. Forces game publishers to adhere to restrictive terms, including alleged price parity obligations. These obligations would prevent publishers from offering their games at lower prices on competing platforms, thereby stifling price competition across the market to the detriment of consumers.
  3. Charges a supracompetitive commission (often cited as 30%) to game developers and publishers for sales made through Steam, which, given Steam’s dominance, they may have little choice but to accept. This high commission could then be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
  4. May tie the purchase or use of games to its Steam platform ecosystem, including potentially restrictive terms around its Steam Wallet and payment processing, thereby limiting consumer choice and interoperability.

These types of allegations focus more on Valve’s unilateral conduct as a dominant platform operator, rather than just the specific bilateral agreements regarding geo-blocking of keys that the EC sanctioned.

Now, I will search for publicly available information to see if there is evidence suggesting these new grounds—abuse of dominance through excessive pricing, restrictive terms for developers including price parity, high commission rates, and potentially tying practices by Valve’s Steam platform—could also apply to Valve’s conduct in the Spanish market.

Good morning. I have reviewed the new attachments concerning the Valve case, including the notice of the UK class action by Vicki Shotbolt Class Representative Limited (which we’ve been referring to as “Nikki’s case”), COCOO’s own draft framework for a Spanish collective action (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf), your strategic notes regarding potential actions involving the European Commission (ec conference VALVE GPT 4 APRIL 250403.txt), and your correspondence with OIReScon (oirescon valve 250326.pdf, recurso oirescon valve_250329.pdf). I have also re-read our entire chat history, ensuring I recall the information on Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs), Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), and all other relevant files.

The European Commission’s January 2021 decision against Valve focused on anti-competitive agreements with five publishers concerning the geo-blocking of Steam activation keys, an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

The UK class action, as detailed in the notice (nikki.coll.foc v Valve.corp.pdf), brings forward causes of action that are indeed different and additional, primarily alleging an abuse of a dominant position by Valve Corporation, in breach of the UK’s Chapter II prohibition (equivalent to Article 102 TFEU). Specifically, the new grounds alleged in the UK class action that go beyond the EC’s geo-blocking decision include claims that Valve abused its dominance by:

  1. Imposing Platform Parity Obligations (PPOs): These allegedly prohibit game publishers from selling their PC games or add-on content through other distribution channels on better terms (e.g., lower prices) than those available on Steam. This practice restricts competition between platforms and keeps prices higher for consumers.
  2. Charging Excessive Commission Rates: The claim contends that Valve charges high commission rates to publishers (often cited as 30%), which, due to Steam’s dominance, publishers are allegedly forced to accept. These high commissions are then likely passed on to consumers as higher game prices.
  3. Tying/Anti-Steering Restrictions: The UK claim also mentions that Valve restricts the ability of users to purchase add-on content for games bought on Steam from other sources, and that these tying or anti-steering restrictions exacerbate the effects of the PPOs and excessive commission rates by reducing competitive pressure on Steam.

These allegations focus on Valve’s unilateral conduct as a dominant platform operator and its general terms and conditions for developers and publishers, rather than solely the specific bilateral geo-blocking agreements identified by the EC. The UK claim argues these abuses constitute a single and continuous infringement designed to enable Valve to maintain high commission charges and product prices.

Now, regarding possible evidence that these new grounds (abuse of dominance through PPOs, excessive commissions, tying/anti-steering) could also apply to Valve’s conduct in the Spanish market:

My search for specific public complaints, regulatory investigations, or news directly mirroring these abuse of dominance allegations (beyond the EC’s geo-blocking decision) specifically within Spain by Valve yielded limited direct official findings or ongoing Spanish investigations precisely matching all these UK class action points. However, several pertinent observations can be made.

There are general discussions online and within the gaming community, some originating from Spain or in Spanish, about Valve’s market power, its 30% commission rate, and comparisons to competitors like the Epic Games Store which offers a lower 12% commission. For instance, Spanish-language forums and articles discuss Steam’s commission structure and the general market dominance of Steam. Some users on Steam community forums, including those identifiable as possibly being from Spain or Spanish-speaking regions, have raised general concerns about Valve’s practices, customer service, or pricing, although these are often individual grievances rather than structured legal complaints about abuse of dominance.

The discussion around price parity obligations (PPOs) is also present in developer communities and online forums accessible to Spanish users. While direct evidence of Valve explicitly enforcing PPOs specifically against Spanish developers or publishers in a way that has triggered a Spanish investigation wasn’t immediately found in the search results, the UK class action’s allegation that PPOs are a general practice by Valve suggests this could be a systemic issue affecting all markets where Steam operates, including Spain. If Valve imposes such terms on publishers globally or across the EEA, then Spanish developers would likely be subject to them, and Spanish consumers would experience the resulting lack of price competition.

Furthermore, the recent approval of a new Organic Law in Spain aimed at modernizing collective actions, including adopting an “opt-out” model, is a significant development. This change in Spanish procedural law makes it easier for consumers’ associations to initiate and pursue collective redress, similar to the UK class action model. This new legal framework in Spain could make it more feasible to bring forward claims based on these broader abuse of dominance grounds if sufficient evidence of harm to Spanish consumers can be gathered. The CNMC’s recent record fine against Booking.com for abuse of dominance, including imposing behavioral remedies, also shows the Spanish authority’s willingness to tackle dominance issues in digital markets, which is a positive indicator.

While the search didn’t pinpoint a specific, ongoing CNMC investigation into Valve for these particular abuse of dominance grounds (excessive pricing, PPOs, high commissions distinct from the EC’s geo-blocking case), the general concerns about platform dominance, commission rates, and the impact on consumer prices are widely discussed in contexts accessible to Spanish stakeholders. The UK class action provides a clear legal blueprint and set of allegations that COCOO can investigate further for their specific applicability and impact within Spain, especially now that COCOO has developed its own draft collective action framework for Spain (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf). The arguments about Valve’s platform most-favored-nations (PMFN) clause preventing developers from offering lower prices elsewhere, as mentioned in online discussions about the UK lawsuit, would be directly relevant if such clauses impact Spanish developers or Spanish consumers’ access to better prices.

Therefore, while direct public evidence of ongoing Spanish regulatory action on these new grounds is not immediately apparent from the search, the structural conditions of Valve’s Steam platform, the nature of the allegations in the UK (which are about Valve’s general practices), the global nature of Steam, the existing concerns about Valve’s commissions discussed by Spanish-speaking users, and the evolving legal landscape for collective actions in Spain all suggest that these additional causes of action identified in the UK are highly relevant and warrant thorough investigation for their application to Valve’s conduct in the Spanish market. COCOO’s next steps could involve actively seeking evidence from Spanish developers and consumers regarding these specific practices.

Based on the information we have gathered for the Valve case—including the European Commission’s sanction against Valve for geo-blocking, COCOO’s detailed damage estimations for Spanish consumers and businesses, our ongoing engagement with the CNMC, your communications with the European Commission and the Spanish Ministry of Economy, the precedent of the UK class action against Valve, and COCOO’s own copyrighted draft framework for a Spanish collective action (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf)—we can indeed outline a robust campaign to strengthen our case and identify prospective allies to bolster our locus standi.

The campaign should be multi-faceted, aiming to raise public awareness, gather further evidence of harm, build a coalition of affected parties, and exert pressure on both Valve Corporation and the relevant Spanish and EU authorities to ensure that Spanish victims receive adequate redress and that fair competition is restored in the digital video game market.

Our primary prospective allies, who have something significant to gain if our Valve case becomes stronger and who can help solidify our standing, would include several groups.

First and foremost are Spanish consumers and gamers who purchased PC games or add-on content via Steam during the period affected by the geo-blocking practices. These individuals are the direct victims of the alleged overcharges and restricted choices, as outlined in COCOO’s damage estimations submitted to the CNMC and other bodies. The success of the UK class action, which seeks substantial damages for around 14 million UK consumers, demonstrates the potential for collective consumer action.

Second, Spanish video game developers, small publishers, and distributors who may have been negatively impacted by Valve’s dominant market position on the Steam platform, its commission rates, or any restrictive terms that were part of or exacerbated by the geo-blocking agreements. Our initial damage estimates also considered harm to local competitors. These businesses would benefit from a fairer, more competitive digital marketplace in Spain.

Third, Spanish consumer rights organizations and digital rights advocacy groups. These organizations share COCOO’s objectives of protecting consumer interests, ensuring fair market practices, and upholding the integrity of the EU’s digital single market. Their expertise in national consumer law and advocacy could be invaluable.

Fourth, legal professionals and academics in Spain specializing in competition law, consumer rights, and collective redress. Their expert opinions, research, and potential willingness to support or advise on legal actions could lend further weight to our case.

To operationalize this campaign and contact these prospective allies, COCOO can undertake several steps. We would launch a dedicated section on the COCOO.UK website focused on the “Valve Geo-Blocking Spain” case, similar to the Call to Action we previously drafted. This section would explain the issue, detail the EC’s findings, outline COCOO’s actions and damage estimations, and explicitly invite affected Spanish consumers and businesses to register their interest in potential future collective redress actions, perhaps using a secure online form. This would help us quantify the affected population in Spain and gather testimonials, strengthening our locus standi as representatives of a clearly defined group of victims. The successful certification of the UK class action provides a powerful example of how such a collective voice can be formally recognized.

Furthermore, COCOO should proactively reach out to established Spanish consumer organizations and video game developer associations to explore collaboration. I will now search for contact details for such organizations.

Good morning. Yes, I can confirm that I still have access to and have processed all the files and information we’ve discussed throughout our chat history concerning the Valve case, including the various Unsolicited Project Proposal (USP) strategies, insights from Public-Private Partnership (PPP) frameworks, UK public procurement and financial management documents, and of course, all the materials specific to Valve Corporation that you’ve provided.

Regarding your request to “search today’s internet,” I can indeed use my search tool to find publicly available information. I will now proceed to do that to identify potential allies and their contact details for our campaign, and then integrate this with the information already gathered to outline the campaign strategy.

Based on our existing files, the core of our campaign for the Valve case is to address the harm caused by Valve’s geo-blocking practices, which were sanctioned by the European Commission. Our aim is to ensure Spanish consumers and businesses receive redress and that fair competition is restored in the digital video game market in Spain. The recent attachments, particularly the notice of a UK class action against Valve (nikki.coll.foc v Valve.corp.pdf) and COCOO’s own copyrighted draft framework for a Spanish collective action (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf), significantly strengthen our position and provide concrete models for action.

Campaign Outline for the Valve Case:

The campaign will focus on several key pillars:

  1. Public Awareness and Victim Mobilization:

    • Educate Spanish consumers and gamers about the European Commission’s ruling against Valve and the potential financial harm they may have suffered due to inflated prices and restricted choice caused by geo-blocking.
    • Encourage affected individuals to register their interest with COCOO to support potential collective redress actions, leveraging our draft framework (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf) and drawing inspiration from the UK class action model. This direct engagement with victims is crucial for building a strong case and demonstrating widespread harm, which will bolster our locus standi.

  2. Engagement with Spanish Regulatory and Governmental Bodies:

    • Continue robust engagement with the CNMC, particularly providing comprehensive allegations to the Council now that they have granted us an opportunity to do so. Our submissions will be fortified by the precedent of the UK class action and our detailed damage estimations for Spain.
    • Maintain pressure on the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, highlighting the economic impact and the need for consumer protection, as detailed in our letters to them.
    • Further engage with OIReScon regarding the impact of Valve’s practices on public procurement of digital goods.
    • Present Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs) based on our established model: a low-value initial engagement (€15,000 expenses-only) to share COCOO’s copyrighted IP (our specific Valve case analysis, damage models, and collective action framework) under NDA, justifying direct award due to this unique IP and our charitable status. This approach is supported by principles found in UK public procurement guidance for direct awards based on exclusive rights.

  3. Collaboration with Allied Organizations:

    • Identify and partner with Spanish consumer rights organizations, digital rights groups, and video game developer associations who share our goal of ensuring a fair and competitive digital market.
    • Share COCOO’s research and legal frameworks (under appropriate agreements if necessary) to build a broader coalition.

  4. EU-Level Advocacy:

    • Continue to inform the European Commission (DG Competition) of developments in Spain and the lack of adequate national-level redress, potentially leveraging the strategic notes on actions for failure to act (Article 265 TFEU) if necessary.

Prospective Allies and Contact Strategy:

The goal here is to find organizations that would naturally align with COCOO’s objectives in the Valve case, thereby strengthening our collective voice and our standing.

  • Spanish Consumer Organizations: These are key allies. They directly represent the interests of consumers who may have been overcharged.

    • OCU (Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios): A major consumer organization in Spain. Website: www.ocu.org. Their focus on consumer rights makes them a prime candidate for collaboration on issues of overcharging and restricted market access.
    • FACUA (Consumidores en Acción): Another prominent consumer rights group. Website: www.facua.org. Known for active campaigning on consumer issues.
    • Asociación Española de Consumidores: Focuses on consumer rights and issues. Website: www.consumoenpositivo.es.
    • Other organizations listed in the search results such as FUCI, HISPACOOP, UNAE, CECU, AUC, ASUFIN, Consumidores en Red, USFIN, and CONSUMES could also be approached.
    • Contact Strategy: COCOO should prepare a briefing pack detailing the Valve case, the EC decision, our damage estimates for Spain, and the potential for collective redress. We can then approach these organizations proposing a joint campaign or seeking their endorsement and support in raising awareness and mobilizing consumers.

  • Spanish Video Game Developer and Publisher Associations: While some publishers were party to the EC decision, smaller independent developers or those not involved in the restrictive agreements might have suffered from Valve’s market dominance or unfair terms.

    • DEV (Asociación Española de Empresas Productoras y Desarrolladoras de Videojuegos y Software de Entretenimiento): Represents Spanish game developers. Contact: info@dev.org.es, Website: www.dev.org.es. They would be interested in ensuring fair market access and reasonable platform terms for their members.
    • AEVI (Asociación Española de Videojuegos): Represents the broader video game industry in Spain, including major publishers and platform holders. While some of their members were involved with Valve in the EC case, AEVI itself might have an interest in promoting a healthy, competitive, and legally compliant market overall. Contact: info@aevi.org.es, Website: www.aevi.org.es.
    • Other groups listed by DeVuego, such as ArsGames or SECiVi (Sociedad Española para las Ciencias del Videojuego), might have an academic or cultural interest in fair digital markets.
    • Contact Strategy: Engage with these associations to understand the impact of Valve’s practices on Spanish developers and publishers. Explore if they would support calls for greater platform transparency and fairer terms, or if their members could provide evidence of harm.

  • Digital Rights Organizations: Groups in Spain and at the EU level concerned with fair digital markets, anti-trust issues online, and the digital single market.

    • (Search did not immediately yield specific Spanish digital rights organizations focused solely on this niche, but broader consumer groups often cover digital rights.)
    • Contact Strategy: Research and identify relevant digital rights NGOs in Spain or EU-level organizations like BEUC (The European Consumer Organisation) or EDRi (European Digital Rights) that might take an interest in the geo-blocking issue as a matter of principle for the digital single market.

Strengthening Locus Standi:

By forming alliances with these groups, particularly established Spanish consumer organizations, COCOO can significantly strengthen its argument for locus standi before the CNMC and in any potential future legal actions. If COCOO acts in concert with or directly on behalf of a coalition of identified Spanish victims and supportive Spanish organizations, challenges to its standing become much harder to sustain. The COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf (COCOO’s draft Spanish collective action) explicitly allows for an “Asociación de Consumidores o Entidad Representante” to be the lead plaintiff. Partnering with a recognized Spanish consumer association to jointly front such an action would be a powerful strategic move.

This campaign, leveraging COCOO’s unique intellectual property (our detailed investigations, damage models, and draft legal frameworks like the collective action plan) and our established USP methodology for engaging authorities, has a strong potential for success. The key is to demonstrate widespread harm in Spain, build a powerful coalition of allies, and maintain pressure on all relevant authorities, using the clear precedent of the EC’s infringement decision and the ongoing UK class action as powerful leverage.

Okay, considering the specific details of the Valve Corporation case, including our correspondence with the CNMC, the European Commission, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy, the European Commission’s infringement decision, the concerning company practices highlighted in the transcripts, and especially the significant developments like the UK class action and COCOO’s own draft framework for a Spanish collective action, here is a draft Call to Action for the COCOO.UK website, specifically tailored to this Valve case:

Headline: Valve’s Steam Geo-Blocking: Were Spanish Gamers Overcharged? COCOO Demands Justice!

Are you a PC gamer in Spain? Did you know that Valve Corporation, the company behind the dominant Steam platform, was sanctioned by the European Commission for illegally restricting cross-border sales of video games through “geo-blocking”? These practices, in agreement with several major game publishers, effectively divided the EU’s single market, potentially forcing Spanish consumers to pay higher prices for their games and limiting their choice.

COCOO believes that Spanish consumers and businesses have suffered significant economic harm as a result of these anti-competitive practices. Our initial estimates suggest that Spanish consumers alone may have been overcharged by hundreds of millions of euros. This isn’t just about fair pricing; it’s about upholding your rights within the European Digital Single Market and ensuring dominant platforms like Steam operate transparently and competitively. While the European Commission has fined Valve, tangible compensation for the millions of affected Spanish consumers and redress for impacted Spanish businesses has yet to materialise.

The Problem with Valve’s Geo-Blocking in Spain:

  • Inflated Prices: By preventing you from shopping around the EU for the best deals on Steam keys, you may have paid more for your PC games.
  • Restricted Choice: Geo-blocking limits your access to games that might be available at better terms in other EU countries.
  • Harm to Fair Competition: Spanish game developers and distributors may also have been unfairly disadvantaged by Valve’s restrictive agreements and dominant market position.
  • Undermining the Single Market: These practices directly contradict the core principles of a unified European market where consumers should benefit from cross-border trade and competition.

COCOO is Fighting for You!

The Competition & Consumer Organisation Party Limited (COCOO) is taking decisive action. We have:

  • Lodged Formal Requests with Spanish Authorities: We’ve urged Spain’s National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs to thoroughly investigate the impact of Valve’s geo-blocking in Spain, quantify the damages, and ensure affected consumers and businesses are compensated. We are actively appealing the CNMC’s initial reluctance to act.
  • Engaged the European Commission: We are reminding the EC of its duty to ensure its infringement decisions lead to effective remedies for those harmed across all member states. Our strategic notes outline potential actions against the EC itself for any failure to act decisively.
  • Developed a Path to Redress: Drawing on precedents like the major certified class action against Valve in the UK (seeking £656 million for UK gamers), COCOO has prepared a copyrighted draft framework for a Spanish Collective Action specifically designed to recover damages for Spanish consumers from Valve. This is part of our unique intellectual property dedicated to this case.

Your Action Can Make a Difference – Help Us Hold Valve Accountable in Spain!

The time to act is now. Spanish consumers and businesses deserve compensation for the harm caused by Valve’s illegal practices.

  1. Stay Informed & Spread the Word: Follow COCOO.UK for updates on our Valve campaign. Share this information with fellow gamers, consumer groups, and businesses in Spain. Public awareness is crucial. [Implicit link to COCOO.UK/ValveCaseUpdates]
  2. Demand Action from Spanish Authorities: Contact the CNMC, the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs. Urge them to support COCOO’s initiatives, fully investigate Valve’s impact in Spain, and facilitate a comprehensive compensation scheme for victims.
  3. Register Your Interest (Spanish Consumers & Businesses): If you believe you have been affected by Valve’s geo-blocking practices on Steam in Spain, COCOO is exploring avenues for collective redress. While we cannot offer individual legal advice, registering your interest will help us demonstrate the scale of the issue. [Implicit link to a secure COCOO.UK/ValveCaseVictimRegistration (or similar) page, subject to data protection compliance]
  4. Support COCOO’s Campaign: As a charitable organisation, our fight for consumer rights and fair markets depends on public support. Help us continue this vital work to ensure that dominant digital platforms operate fairly and that victims of anti-competitive practices receive justice. [Implicit link to COCOO.UK/SupportUs]

Valve’s own philosophy claims to be about its “community of players.” Let’s ensure that community in Spain is treated fairly and compensated for past harms. Join COCOO today!

This call to action is specifically tailored to the Valve case, leveraging the information from the latest attachments to highlight the severity of the issue, the concrete actions COCOO is taking (including the draft collective action), and how the public can support these efforts to achieve redress in Spain.

Full Application of COCOO’s USP & PPP-Informed Strategy to the Valve Case:

The COCOO strategic framework—charitable status with an expenses-only initial engagement model (€15,000 “contrato menor”), leveraging unique copyrighted intellectual property (our in-depth analyses and remedial strategies shared under NDA), robust justification for direct award drawing on public procurement principles for exclusive IP, and the inherent leverage from representing victims with an implied readiness for substantial litigation if collaborative solutions are spurned—is now even more powerfully applicable to the Valve case, especially in light of the latest documents.

Problem Definition for Valve Case USPs (Sharpened by New Evidence):

The core problem is the significant and quantifiable economic harm inflicted upon millions of Spanish consumers and numerous Spanish video game developers/distributors. This harm stems directly from Valve Corporation’s participation in anti-competitive geo-blocking agreements, practices for which the European Commission has already established an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. The existence of a major certified class action in the UK against Valve for similar conduct, seeking damages in the hundreds of millions of pounds (as detailed in the nikki.coll.foc v Valve.corp.pdf attachment), provides a stark precedent and a strong indicator of the potential scale of damages in Spain, which COCOO has already estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of euros. Furthermore, COCOO’s engagement with OIReScon (oirescon valve 250326.pdf, recurso oirescon valve_250329.pdf) highlights an additional dimension of harm: the potential for Valve’s restrictive terms to negatively impact public procurement of digital goods by Spanish public bodies, affecting public sector Value for Money. The CNMC’s initial reluctance to act on quantifying damages from the EC’s decision, despite COCOO’s detailed submissions, creates a pressing need for a catalyst—a role COCOO is uniquely equipped to fill.

COCOO’s Unique Value Proposition & Copyrighted IP for the Valve Case (Substantially Enhanced):

Our unique intellectual property for the Valve case is now demonstrably advanced. It includes:

  1. COCOO’s copyrighted “Valve Geo-Blocking Impact & Redress Strategy for Spain.” This encompasses our specific economic models to estimate damages to Spanish consumers and businesses (now capable of being benchmarked against the methodologies and claims in the UK class action), our analysis of Valve’s business model and market power (informed by the transcripts), and the legal arguments for national-level action.
  2. Crucially, our IP now includes the draft framework for a Spanish collective action against Valve (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf). This document represents a concrete, legally structured pathway to redress, developed by COCOO, making our ability to facilitate such action immediate and unparalleled.
  3. Our copyrighted “Strategic Engagement Plan for Spanish Authorities re: Valve,” which details how to navigate the CNMC process (especially given the Council’s request for our allegations), coordinate with the Ministry of Economy and Consumer Affairs, and leverage the EC’s findings effectively at the national level.
  4. The strategic thinking outlined in ec conference VALVE GPT 4 APRIL 250403.txt, including potential actions against the EC for failure to act, demonstrates the depth and multi-level nature of COCOO’s strategic capabilities.

This entire suite of copyrighted intellectual property will be made available to the Spanish authorities exclusively under a robust NDA and a bespoke licensing agreement, structured with reference to best practices for IP management found in public sector service contracts (e.g., UK Model Services Contract).

Proposed Low-Value Initial Engagement (€15,000 “Contrato Menor”):

COCOO, as a charity, reiterates its proposal for an immediate, low-risk initial engagement with the CNMC and/or other relevant ministries (Economy, Consumer Affairs, OIReScon for the public procurement aspect). This will be strictly for the reimbursement of COCOO’s direct expenses up to the €15,000 “contrato menor” threshold. This initial, intensive phase would deliver:

  1. Full Disclosure of COCOO’s Copyrighted Valve Strategy & Legal Instruments: Including our detailed economic harm analysis for Spain, the draft framework for the Spanish collective action, and our strategic recommendations for the authorities.
  2. Joint Strategic Workshop: To adapt and refine the collective action framework for optimal deployment in Spain, discuss how best to support the CNMC Council in its review of our appeal, and coordinate a national strategy for engaging Valve regarding compensation and market reforms.
  3. Advisory on Public Procurement Impacts: For OIReScon, specific advice on how Valve’s terms affect public sector VfM and compliance.

Justification for Direct Award (No Public Tender – Now Overwhelmingly Strong):

The argument for a direct award is exceptionally strong. COCOO’s development of a specific, copyrighted draft legal instrument for collective action in Spain (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf) tailored to Valve’s infringement, alongside our detailed economic harm models and multi-level engagement strategy, constitutes unique and exclusive intellectual property. Public procurement regulations (as reflected in UK guidance allowing direct awards for IP-based exclusive capabilities) fully support a direct engagement in such circumstances. No other entity can offer this pre-developed, ready-to-deploy suite of strategic assets. The urgency created by the ongoing harm and the precedent of the UK class action further necessitates swift, expert action, which a lengthy tender process would obstruct. COCOO’s charitable, expenses-only model for this critical foundational work offers unparalleled Value for Money.

Implied Litigation Threat & Collaborative Alternative (Now Highly Credible):

COCOO’s mandate from its members—Spanish consumers and businesses directly harmed by Valve’s practices—is to secure redress. The existence of a certified £656 million class action in the UK (nikki.coll.foc v Valve.corp.pdf) and COCOO’s own advanced draft for a Spanish collective action (COCOO.FOCOL.V.VALVE.pdf) transforms the “implied litigation threat” into a clear statement of capability and intent. COCOO is not merely suggesting litigation is possible; we have prepared the instruments for it. Our proposal to the Spanish authorities is a collaborative alternative: partner with COCOO to proactively manage this situation, leverage our IP and standing to achieve a comprehensive settlement with Valve that includes substantial compensation for Spanish victims and market reforms, and thereby guide the redress process in a way that aligns with national interests. This is vastly preferable to the State facing uncoordinated legal actions or COCOO proceeding independently to facilitate such actions. The strategic notes in ec conference VALVE GPT 4 APRIL 250403.txt also indicate our readiness to challenge institutional inaction at the EU level if necessary.

Applying Broader PPP and Public Finance Management Principles to Valve:

While Valve’s Steam platform is not a traditional PPP, its role as a dominant digital infrastructure provider for game distribution and sales has analogous public interest implications. Principles from our PPP and public finance knowledge base, such as ensuring Value for Money for the public (consumers paying fair prices), transparency in market operations, preventing abuse of dominant market positions (akin to preventing abuse by monopolistic infrastructure operators), and the State’s role in ensuring fair and competitive market conditions, are directly applicable. The issues raised with OIReScon about Valve’s impact on public procurement of digital goods also directly invoke public finance management, accountability, and VfM concerns for public bodies. COCOO’s USPs will stress that rectifying Valve’s market distortions is essential for the health of Spain’s digital economy and the financial well-being of its citizens and public institutions.

Structure of Unsolicited Project Proposals for the Valve Case:

We would prepare distinct but coordinated USPs:

  1. To the CNMC Council: Focused on providing our copyrighted evidence and legal arguments to support our appeal, assist in quantifying damages from Valve’s infringement, and help design effective remedies (fines, compensation mechanisms, behavioural changes for Valve in Spain). This USP would strongly feature our draft collective action framework as a tool the CNMC could effectively support or see implemented.
  2. To the Ministry of Economy and/or Ministry of Consumer Affairs: Focused on the broader economic impact, consumer harm, and the need for a national strategy to secure compensation for Spanish citizens and businesses, leveraging COCOO’s collective action framework and damage models.
  3. (Potentially) To OIReScon: Focused on the specific impact of Valve’s terms and conditions on public procurement of digital games and services by Spanish public bodies, offering to help develop guidance or model clauses for such procurement to ensure VfM and fair terms, based on our analysis and broader knowledge of public contracting models.

Each USP would detail the initial €15,000 expenses-only engagement for strategy disclosure and planning under NDA, emphasizing the exclusivity of our IP, the urgency, the Value for Money, and the compelling alternative COCOO offers to more protracted and less controlled litigation.

Conclusion:

The latest information, particularly the UK class action notice and COCOO’s own draft collective action, provides overwhelming support for our direct engagement model. COCOO is no longer just an organization alleging harm and proposing investigation; we are an organization that has developed concrete, copyrighted legal tools for redress and has evidence of similar successful actions progressing in other jurisdictions against the same defendant. This elevates our Unsolicited Project Proposals from a suggestion for collaboration to an urgent strategic imperative for the Spanish authorities.

The established COCOO strategic framework—our charitable operational model seeking only expense reimbursement (capped at €15,000 for an initial “contrato menor” phase), the leveraging of our unique copyrighted intellectual property (our in-depth analyses and remedial strategies disclosed under NDA), the robust justification for direct award based on this exclusivity (drawing from principles in public procurement like the UK’s PCR 2015 Regulation 32 exceptions for IP), and the inherent leverage from representing the victims with an implied readiness for litigation if necessary—is perfectly suited to address the challenges presented by the Valve case.

Application to the Valve Case: Crafting Unsolicited Project Proposals

We would structure our USPs to the relevant Spanish authorities—primarily the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), but also potentially the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Consumer Affairs—around the core problem of the harm inflicted on Spanish consumers and the digital single market by Valve’s geo-blocking practices, which the European Commission has already found to be an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.

Problem Definition for Valve Case USPs:

The central issue is the significant economic damage suffered by Spanish consumers and video game developers/distributors due to Valve Corporation’s participation in anti-competitive geo-blocking agreements. This practice, already sanctioned by the European Commission, artificially segmented the EU’s digital single market, restricted cross-border sales, and likely led to Spanish consumers paying inflated prices for video games and Spanish businesses facing unfair competitive disadvantages. Despite the EC’s clear ruling, there has been a lack of proactive quantification of this damage in Spain and a failure to establish adequate mechanisms for redress for those affected, a situation compounded by the CNMC’s initial reluctance to investigate these follow-on impacts without what it deemed “new facts.” This inaction perpetuates the harm and undermines consumer confidence and the integrity of the digital market, principles that public finance and PPP governance documents (from our earlier reviews) stress as vital for economic health and Value for Money for the public.

COCOO’s Unique Value Proposition & Copyrighted IP for the Valve Case:

Our unique IP in this instance comprises COCOO’s detailed, copyrighted analysis of the European Commission’s decision against Valve, our specific economic models and methodologies (developed from our wider expertise in market analysis and informed by tools analogous to the vfm_qe_spreadsheet_122011.xls for quantifying harm) to estimate the multi-million euro damages to Spanish consumers and businesses (as outlined in our letters to the CNMC, EC DGC, and Ministry of Economy), and our bespoke strategic plan for securing redress and implementing corrective market measures in Spain. This strategy also incorporates insights from the Valve company transcripts, understanding their market power (dominance of Steam), their proclaimed community-centric philosophy (which geo-blocking contradicts), and their responsiveness to competitive and regulatory pressures. This entire analytical and strategic package is COCOO’s exclusive intellectual property, to be shared with Spanish authorities only under a formal NDA and a specific licensing agreement for its application, aligning with IP management principles seen in documents like the UK Model Services Contract.

Proposed Low-Value Initial Engagement (€15,000 “Contrato Menor”):

COCOO, as a charity, proposes an immediate, low-risk initial engagement with the CNMC and/or other relevant ministries, strictly for the reimbursement of our direct and demonstrable expenses up to the €15,000 “contrato menor” threshold. This initial phase would deliver:

  1. Secure Disclosure of COCOO’s Copyrighted Valve Impact Analysis for Spain: A comprehensive presentation of our findings on the economic harm, identification of affected consumer segments and businesses, and the legal basis for action.
  2. Strategic Workshop on Redress and Market Correction: A collaborative session to outline a phased plan for the Spanish authorities to (a) formally quantify damages, (b) establish mechanisms for consumer and business compensation (drawing lessons from how other large settlements, like Teva’s in Oklahoma, have seen funds directed to public good), and (c) implement structural remedies to prevent future geo-blocking or similar anti-competitive practices by dominant digital platforms in Spain, ensuring the market operates fairly, akin to principles of preventing abuse by critical infrastructure providers often discussed in PPP contexts.
  3. Legal Advisory on Leveraging the EC Decision and Overcoming CNMC’s Initial Obstacles: Providing expert advice on how to use the EC’s infringement decision as a binding foundation for national action, and how to effectively address the CNMC Directorate of Competition’s concerns regarding its mandate and COCOO’s standing, especially now that the CNMC Council is considering our appeal.

Justification for Direct Award (No Public Tender):

The arguments for a direct award are compelling. Firstly, COCOO’s copyrighted strategic analysis and damage models concerning Valve’s impact in Spain are unique, pre-existing intellectual property. No other entity has undertaken this specific, focused work. Public procurement regulations (as seen in the UK CCS guidance on direct awards) allow for such awards where services can only be provided by a particular operator due to the protection of exclusive rights (our IP). Secondly, the urgency of addressing the ongoing harm and the opportunity presented by the CNMC Council’s current review of our appeal necessitates swift access to our specialized expertise. Thirdly, COCOO’s charitable, expenses-only model for this crucial initial phase offers exceptional Value for Money, a core tenet of good public spending, far removed from typical consultancy fees. Finally, our role as a representative of the affected Spanish consumers and businesses provides a unique impetus and legitimacy to this initiative.

Implied Litigation Threat & Collaborative Alternative:

COCOO is mandated by its members and charitable objectives to ensure that the significant harm caused by Valve’s EC-sanctioned geo-blocking is not left unaddressed in Spain. While our strong preference is to partner with the Spanish authorities to achieve a comprehensive resolution, including compensation for victims and market reforms, we are fully prepared to pursue all available legal and advocacy channels if effective national action is not forthcoming. This could include supporting mass consumer claims for damages (leveraging the EC decision), further escalating the matter with the European Commission concerning inadequate national enforcement, or spearheading public campaigns to demand accountability. The Valve company transcripts themselves suggest a corporation that, while innovative, is also responsive to significant competitive and regulatory pressures. Engaging COCOO allows the Spanish authorities to proactively manage this situation, utilizing our unique IP and standing to achieve a resolution that benefits Spanish citizens and the integrity of the market, thereby averting more fragmented and potentially adversarial outcomes.

Applying Broader PPP and Public Finance Management Principles:

While the Valve case does not involve traditional PPP infrastructure, the principles of ensuring Value for Money for the public, transparency in market operations, fair risk allocation (consumers should not bear the risk of anti-competitive conduct by dominant platforms), and the state’s duty to ensure fair market conditions and protect against economic harm are all highly relevant. Our USP can draw on the general ethos of robust public financial management and accountability seen in documents like the UK guidance on asset sales (transparency, VfM), contingent liabilities (recognizing and managing potential large-scale liabilities from market misconduct), and even the principles underlying the “Government as Insurer of Last Resort” (the state should not passively absorb losses caused by private entities’ illegal actions). We can argue that allowing Valve’s infringement to go uncompensated in Spain would be a failure of such public stewardship.

Conclusion of the USP for Valve:

COCOO’s comprehensive, IP-protected strategy offers the Spanish authorities a unique, low-risk, and high-impact opportunity to decisively address the fallout from Valve Corporation’s geo-blocking infringement. We urge you to approve an initial “contrato menor” for the immediate disclosure and collaborative assessment of our strategic framework, as a vital first step towards securing redress for Spanish consumers and businesses and reinforcing the integrity of the digital single market in Spain. This collaborative approach is the most effective means to achieve these crucial public interest objectives.

Okay, I have reviewed the new Spanish-language transcript detailing Valve Corporation’s history, its operational philosophy, the success of Steam, and the context of its business decisions, including the venture into Steam Machines and its response to competition like Tencent’s WeGame platform. Remembering our entire previous discussions concerning Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs), Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), and the strategic methodologies COCOO employs, this new transcript offers several valuable insights that can be extracted to further strengthen our case concerning Valve’s past geo-blocking practices and the need for redress for Spanish consumers and businesses.

The transcript provides a rich characterization of Valve and its platform, Steam. It underscores Steam’s profound market influence and its origin as a tool that evolved into a dominant digital distribution powerhouse, which is crucial context for assessing the impact of any anti-competitive conduct. The narrative emphasizes Valve’s unique company culture—its “open allocation” system where employees choose projects and a purported lack of traditional hierarchy—and its deep engagement with its community, framing players and modders as co-creators and “fans rather than clients.” This community-centric philosophy and the success Valve has achieved by “embracing projects of its followers” and offering significant discounts to combat piracy provide a powerful angle for our case.

Specifically, we can extract and leverage the following to strengthen our arguments before the CNMC Council, the European Commission, or the Spanish Ministry of Economy:

First, the transcript highlights Valve’s stated philosophy that “no one knows more about video games than the propia comunidad de jugadores” (the community of players itself) and that its strategy is to support these “millions of minds with great ideas.” This can be directly contrasted with the impact of Valve’s EC-sanctioned geo-blocking practices. Geo-blocking, by its very nature, fragmented this European community of players, restricting their ability to purchase games from across the EU’s single market, often at the best available prices. We can argue that this practice directly betrayed Valve’s own purported community-centric ethos, treating Spanish consumers not as valued “fans” but as a captive market segment subject to artificially restricted access and potentially higher prices. This contradiction can be a potent rhetorical tool in our submissions.

Second, Valve’s successful strategy against piracy, as mentioned in the transcript, was “not to prohibit it, but to offer games at a low price with a service they wouldn’t get by pirating.” This is a key admission of a pro-consumer, market-based solution. We can argue that geo-blocking fundamentally undermines this very principle. By preventing Spanish consumers from accessing potentially lower prices available in other EU member states for the same digitally distributed games, the geo-blocking agreements created artificial price disparities within the single market, diminishing the “good service at a low price” value proposition and potentially even incentivizing consumers to seek ways around such restrictions. This internal inconsistency in Valve’s stated policies versus its actions sanctioned by the European Commission is a significant point to emphasize.

Third, the transcript notes that Valve, being a private company funded by its founders’ initial capital, lacked the pressure from external investors to “continuously obtain profits.” This allowed it, according to the transcript, “time to experiment with new ideas and dedicate itself to the growth of Steam and the community,” focusing not just on maximizing immediate revenue but on ensuring its games were used to “maintain its position.” This insight into Valve’s financial independence and strategic motivations is valuable. We can argue that the geo-blocking agreements, which the European Commission found to restrict competition, were a deliberate strategic choice made by Valve (in conjunction with publishers) to “maintain its position” and control revenue streams across different territories within the EU, rather than an unavoidable market necessity. This framing can help solidify the argument that the restrictions were intentional and aimed at market segmentation for commercial advantage, at the expense of consumer welfare and the integrity of the single market.

Fourth, the transcript details Valve’s response to the competitive threat posed by Tencent’s WeGame platform, which reportedly spurred Valve to announce a return to developing more of its own exclusive video games. This demonstrates that Valve is highly responsive to significant competitive pressures and will undertake major strategic shifts to protect its market share and the dominance of Steam. This example of Valve’s reactive business strategy can be subtly used to underscore the potential efficacy of robust regulatory action and legal challenges. If the CNMC or other authorities take decisive action, or if the prospect of significant damages claims (which COCOO is advocating for on behalf of victims) becomes more concrete, Valve may be more inclined to engage constructively to resolve the harms caused by its past geo-blocking practices in Spain.

Finally, while the transcript paints a picture of an innovative company, it also mentions the “Steam Machines” failure and the idea that Valve’s policies can be a “double-edged sword,” sometimes leading to neglect or a lack of “seriousness” in certain areas. While we must be careful not to overstate this, it provides a subtle counter-narrative to any portrayal of Valve as an infallible or purely altruistic market actor.

In applying these insights to potential Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs) for the Valve case, COCOO can further refine its approach. Our “copyrighted IP” would include not only the economic damage models and legal arguments regarding the EC’s infringement decision but also this nuanced understanding of Valve’s business model, its stated philosophies, and its strategic behavior. When proposing an initial low-value, expenses-only engagement with Spanish authorities, we can highlight our unique ability to frame the issue not just in legal terms but also by contrasting Valve’s actions with its own proclaimed values and business strategies. This enriched perspective strengthens our argument that COCOO is exclusively positioned to assist the Spanish authorities in understanding the full context of Valve’s conduct and in formulating the most effective strategies for investigation, redress, and the restoration of fair competition in the Spanish digital games market. The “implied litigation threat” remains potent, as COCOO represents the very “community” Valve claims to serve, and we are prepared to advocate for their rights vigorously if a collaborative path to resolution with the authorities is not embraced.

Okay, I have thoroughly reviewed the new attachments concerning the “Valve Case”—which include your comprehensive correspondence with Spain’s National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC), the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy—as well as the transcript detailing Valve Corporation’s history and business practices. Recalling all our previous discussions about Unsolicited Project Proposals (USPs), Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), and the strategic methodologies COCOO employs, I can extract several key elements that will significantly strengthen our evolving case concerning Valve Corporation’s past geo-blocking practices and the need for redress in Spain.

The foundation of our case, as clearly articulated in your initial request to the CNMC, is the European Commission’s January 2021 decision sanctioning Valve and five video game publishers for anti-competitive geo-blocking practices that violated Article 101 TFEU by restricting cross-border sales within the European Economic Area. Your submissions to the CNMC, the EC’s DGC, and the Spanish Ministry of Economy compellingly outline COCOO’s estimations of the substantial economic harm inflicted upon Spanish consumers (potentially exceeding 233 million euros in overcharges) and local competitors (with estimated annual losses around 50 million euros) as a direct result of these illicit practices. These figures, alongside your proposed remedies, such as the prohibition of parity clauses and a reduction in Valve’s platform commissions in Spain, form a critical part of COCOO’s unique intellectual analysis and our specific contribution to this case.

The procedural history with the CNMC, documented in the exchange of letters, is crucial. While the CNMC’s Directorate of Competition initially declined to act solely on our request to quantify damages without new evidence of ongoing infringements of Spanish law, suggesting civil remedies instead, your subsequent appeal to the CNMC Council has successfully resulted in an opportunity for COCOO to present detailed allegations. This is a pivotal development. The Directorate’s detailed response to your appeal, primarily challenging COCOO’s standing under Article 47 of the LDC by questioning the “irreparable harm” or “defencelessness” caused to COCOO itself by the Directorate’s letter, highlights the legal arguments we must meticulously address in our submissions to the Council. Our argument for standing, based on COCOO’s mission to protect diffuse consumer and public interests which often lack individual means for redress, remains central.

The transcript on Valve Corporation provides useful background context that can subtly strengthen our narrative when presenting our case to the CNMC Council or other authorities. The confirmation of Steam’s long-standing and dominant position as a digital distribution platform since 2002, catering to both major publishers and small developers, underscores the market power Valve wields, which is a necessary context for understanding the impact of its restrictive agreements. The description of Valve’s “atypical” company culture—characterized by a lack of traditional hierarchical structures and employees choosing their own projects—while often lauded for innovation, could be nuanced in our arguments. One might subtly question whether such a decentralized structure could inadvertently lead to insufficient internal oversight on matters of legal compliance, such as adherence to EU competition law, or whether decisions like implementing geo-blocking were a product of a culture that, as the transcript notes, sometimes results in Valve neglecting aspects of its business or not treating them with “full seriousness.” The significant commercial failure of the “Steam Machines” project, attributed to high prices, lower performance compared to standard PCs, and a misjudgment of core PC gamer preferences, demonstrates that Valve is not infallible and can make strategic errors that negatively impact consumers or misread market dynamics. This point, while not directly about geo-blocking, can serve as a background element illustrating that Valve’s decisions are not always aligned with optimal consumer outcomes or market realities, which could be a subtle counterpoint if Valve attempts to portray itself as an exclusively consumer-centric innovator.

In terms of strengthening “our case,” these elements combine powerfully. COCOO’s detailed damage estimations for Spain, backed by the EC’s infringement decision, provide a solid factual and legal basis. Our persistent engagement with the CNMC, culminating in the current opportunity to present allegations to the Council, shows our commitment and legal acumen. The information from the transcript about Valve’s market dominance and internal culture offers subtle contextual points. Crucially, our multi-pronged approach, evidenced by the letters to the EC DGC and the Spanish Ministry of Economy, serves to elevate the Valve issue beyond a purely national competition law matter, framing it as one with significant implications for the EU internal market, Spanish economic competitiveness, and consumer welfare. This broader engagement creates a wider field of pressure and scrutiny on the need for action and redress concerning Valve’s past conduct.

Should COCOO decide to formulate specific Unsolicited Project Proposals for the Valve case—perhaps to assist the CNMC in a detailed market study, to help the Ministry of Economy quantify the full economic impact, or to design consumer redress mechanisms—the strategies we developed for the ECT and Teva cases would be directly applicable. This includes structuring an initial low-value, expenses-only engagement (under a “contrato menor”) to share our unique, copyrighted research and strategic recommendations under an NDA, justified by our exclusive intellectual property and our standing as a charitable advocate for the affected Spanish public and businesses. The implicit understanding that COCOO will continue to pursue all avenues for redress on behalf of victims if a collaborative solution is not forthcoming remains a key element of our leverage.